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THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON DATA PRIVACY:
TAKING A CUE FROM THE CISG
INTRODUCTION
ince its inception, the Internet was designed to be both
borderless and global in nature.1 The Internet allows for
the movement of data around the world with the click of a
mouse, making the distinguishing of geographic boundaries
within the Internet impossible.2 Furthermore, recent techno-
logical developments3 have provided companies with low-cost,
reliable means to transfer personal data around the world at
an exceedingly fast rate.4 As a result, the commercial industry
has utilized these advances to establish relationships with cus-
tomers and businesses located in different nations, resulting in
increased economic globalization.5
Consequently, there is now “a nearly constant flow of person-
al information across national borders.”6 Examples of this type
of information include individual’s names, addresses, races, ag-
es, and can span to extremely sensitive information like the
fact that someone is currently expecting a child.7 With the new-
found ease of collecting and transferring personal information,
businesses have been able to collect, analyze, and package this
1. Lothar Determann & Karl T. Guttenberg, On War and Peace in Cyber-
space: Security, Privacy, Jurisdiction, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 875, 891
(2014).
2. Id. at 892; Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving
Global Privacy Rules Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1029, 1033 (2013).
3. One specific significant technological advance is the mobile internet.
See generally Michael Kende, Internet Society Global Internet Report 2015:
Mobile Evolution and Development of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY,
http://www.internetsociety.org/globalinternetreport/assets/download/IS_web.
pdf. Other significant technological advances include the use of the Cloud and
the employment of multipoint data processing networks. Hirsch, supra note
2, at 1032–33.
4. Id. at 1032.
5. Id. at 1032–33.
6. Id. at 1033.
7. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know
About You, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014),
http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-about-what-data-
brokers-know-about-you.
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sensitive data to sell to advertisers and other entities as a
commodity.8 Often, individuals are not even aware that their
information is being sold in this capacity.9 Additionally, the in-
creased flow of personal data has led to a significant growth in
the amount of data breaches that occur, which expose consum-
ers’ personal information to untrusted hands.10 The increased
transfer of data around the world has therefore raised signifi-
cant privacy concerns amongst consumers.11
To address these privacy concerns, a number of jurisdictions
promulgated regulations aimed to protect the personal infor-
mation of their citizens.12 Despite these efforts, the global na-
ture of the Internet renders jurisdictional-specific legislation
both weak and ineffective. Specifically, the fast and unpredict-
able movement of data transfers “makes it difficult to track and
enforce compliance” with legislation of this nature.13 Addition-
ally, when issues arise regarding data that has passed through
a number of jurisdictions, it becomes extremely difficult to de-
termine which laws apply to that data.14 This is significant be-
cause huge disparities exist between the levels of protection
afforded by different regions around the world.15 The lack of
8. Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information,
CBS NEWS (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-
selling-your-personal-information/.
9. Id.
10. Kathryn F. Russo, Regulation of Companies’ Data Security Practices
Under the FTC Act and California Unfair Competition Law, 32 COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAW., May 2015 (noting that approximately 7 percent of American
citizens over the age of fifteen were victims of identity theft in 2012).
11. Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1037–38.
12. For a survey of data-privacy laws all over the world, see generally
BAKERHOSTETLER, 2015 INTERNATIONAL COMPENDIUM OF DATA PRIVACY LAWS
(2014),
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20docu
ments/International-Compendium-of-Data-Privacy-Laws.pdf.
13. Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1029.
14. See generally id.
15. For example, there is current debate about what laws have jurisdiction
over emails within a Microsoft server in Ireland. Microsoft ‘Must Release’ Da-
ta Held on Dublin Server, BBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27191500 Ireland, being a member of
the EU, is subject to extensive laws protecting personal data, far surpassing
the protection U.S. law provides. Id. In September 2015, oral arguments were
heard at the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where the Department
of Justice argued that the U.S. government can “demand emails from anyone
in the world from any email provider headquartered in within US borders . . .
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uniform standards for data privacy creates uncertainty
amongst individuals as to what protections they are guaran-
teed, which inevitably creates apprehension toward using the
services of foreign companies. 16 Furthermore, companies’ ef-
forts to comply with the disparate legal requirements of differ-
ent nations are costly and ultimately lead companies to pass
the costs onto consumers through increased prices of goods and
services.17
In the past, an awareness of the problems associated with di-
verging data-privacy law has led to cooperative endeavors be-
tween individual governments. One recent example is the ef-
forts made by the EU and U.S. governments to provide a legal
mechanism allowing for the free flow of personal data between
the two regions.18 Due to the fact that the EU has much stricter
data-privacy requirements than the United States, U.S. com-
panies face high costs in the implementation of data-privacy
practices that are considered legal under the EU regime.19 In
order to mitigate these costs, both governments entered into an
agreement in July 2000 that created the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
program (the “Safe Harbor”),20 which allowed U.S. companies
to legally transfer personal data from the EU to the United
States for fifteen years.21 On October 6, 2015, however, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered the Safe Harbor inva-
.” Sam Thielman, Microsoft Case: DOJ Says It Can Demand Every Email
From Any US-Based Provider, (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/09/microsoft-court-case-
hotmail-ireland-search-warrant. The oral argument was concluded by both
the counsel for Microsoft and one of the three sitting judges calling for Con-
gress to step in and create legislation in this area. Id. A ruling has not yet
been issued on this case. Id.
16. See Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commis-
sioner, 2015 E.C.R. 117/15; Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1037–38.
17. Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1037–38.
18. See James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftherious, The EU-U.S.
Privacy Safe Harbor: Smooth Sailing and or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 145, 147 (2001).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Letter from EU Commission to Robert LaRussa, Undersec’y for Int’l
Trade of U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (July 28, 2000),
https://build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018494; Schrems, 2015
E.C.R. 117/15.
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lid, leaving U.S. companies anxiously awaiting the fate of their
future ability to do business in the EU.22
Despite the current obstacles in place, the international flow
of personal data remains “fundamental to the Internet econ-
omy.”23 Consequently, fragmentation of the Internet would
cause serious harm to the global economy, limit the freedom of
information, harm communications between nations, and lead
to a regress in technology, which in turn could lead to increased
tensions between nations.24
In trying to formulate a solution to this global problem, it is
useful to look at another area of international law created at a
moment when international cooperation was crucial in order to
allow the global market and economy to operate fluidly. Inter-
national sales of goods once faced a similar need for cooperation
between nations, which resulted in the creation of a private in-
ternational law that has been hailed as “by far the most thor-
ough example of diplomatic drafting in multi-jurisdictional pri-
vate law ever.”25 This law is the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).26
The CISG was created in 1980 for the purpose of providing a
uniform set of laws to facilitate international sales of goods.27
The approach taken in drafting the CISG consisted of creating
a simplified body of law that could be easily applied by differ-
ent legal systems.28 The drafting process involved active partic-
ipation by interested nations, which established a foundation of
trust in its overall operation and well thought-out provisions
22. Tom Jowitt, EU Safe Harbour 2.0 Data Transfer Deal Set For Next
Month, TECHWEEK EUR. (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/e-
regulation/eu-to-meet-in-february-for-safe-harbour-2-0-data-transfers-
183919.
23. Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1030.
24. Determann & Guttenberg supra note 1, at 879.
25. Camilla Baasch Andersen, General Principles of the CISG—Generally
Impenetrable?, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 13, 14–15 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter
eds., 2008).
26. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983),
1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG].
27. Id. pmbl.
28. See generally Kazuaki Sono, The Vienna Sales Convention: History and
Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 1, 1–17 (Petar Sarcevic
& Paul Volken eds., 1986).
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that have held up over the years.29 Since its creation thirty-five
years ago, eighty-four states have adopted the CISG.30
In order to alleviate the problems that currently plague the
data industry, an international convention on the collection,
transfer, and processing of personal data is needed. To both fa-
cilitate and ensure its success, drafters should employ the
CISG as an example for modeling this new convention. By do-
ing so, drafters can build upon on the strengths and the weak-
nesses of the CISG, which has generated years of research and
analysis.31
Part I of this Note will examine the current frameworks for
data-privacy law in the EU and the United States, noting the
different approaches each region has taken to regulating data
privacy. This Part first provides an evaluation of EU law,
which includes an assessment of the European Union Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC (“EU Directive”) and the EU’s
newest piece of legislation, the General Data Protection Regu-
lation (“GDPR”). It will then analyze U.S. law, by looking first
at the statutory framework in the United States. Subsequently,
it will then analyze the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) role
in data-privacy protection and consider additional efforts in the
United States to regulate data privacy. Part II will provide an
overview of past efforts toward international cooperation on
data privacy. It will first look at the Safe Harbor and outline
how it came to be, why it no longer exists, and what the next
steps are for EU-U.S. data transfers under the newly agreed
upon EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (“Privacy Shield”). It will then go
on to look at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and examine the contributions it has
provided to international data-privacy law, specifically looking
to the contribution of the OECD Guidelines Governing the Pro-
tection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
(“OECD Guidelines”). This Part will then examine the Global
Privacy Enforcement Network (GPEN), looking at why it was
created, what its current efforts involve, and what its creation
29. See generally id.
30. Albert H. Kritzer, CISG: Table of Contracting States, CISG DATABASE,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last updated Jan. 8,
2016).
31. Pace Law School provides a database dedicated to scholarly material
on the CISG. See CISGDATABASE, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last updated
Jan. 29, 2016).
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means for the future of international data-security. Finally,
Part III will analyze the CISG and use its framework as a
model to propose an international convention on data privacy.
This analysis includes a comparison between the current state
of data privacy to the state of international trade when the
CISG was created. It will also expose the major weaknesses of
the CISG and how a new convention on data privacy can ame-
liorate the weaknesses that promulgated from the implementa-
tion of the CISG. Additionally, it will examine the differences
between these two areas of law and how the CISG model can be
modified to fit the needs of an international data-privacy con-
vention.
I. CURRENTDATA-PRIVACY LAWS
Privacy law is grounded in the protection of personal in-
formation.32 More specifically, “[p]rivacy laws regulate various
aspects of the collection, use, processing, storage and disclo-
sure” of personal information that relates to identifiable indi-
viduals. 33 Two regions that have taken very different ap-
proaches to personal data privacy are the EU and the United
States. Despite their many differences, these regions’ econo-
mies are dependent on one another, as they have the most sub-
stantial relationship in both trade and investment in the
world.34 Furthermore, despite their different approaches to da-
ta privacy, the highest rate of cross-border data exchange oc-
curs between these two regions.35 As a result, both the EU and
United States have made a notable effort to cooperate with
each other, which continues to evolve over time.
A. The EU
The EU provides the most extensive set of laws governing da-
ta privacy in the world.36 The EU’s data-privacy legislation is
32. Brian M. Gaff et al., Privacy and Data Security, COMPUTING & LAW,
Mar. 2012, at 9, 9,
http://www.edwardswildman.com/files/upload/March%202012.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Joshua P. Meltzer, The Importance of the Internet and Transatlantic
Data Flows for the U.S. and EU Trade and Investment 1 (Global Econ. &
Dev., Working Paper 79, 2014).
35. Id.
36. Publisher’s Editorial Staff, International Privacy Issues, 23 No. 3 INT’L
HR J. art. 4, 1 (2014) [hereinafter International Privacy Issues].
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important precedent for purposes of this Note because it recog-
nizes and aims to address the problem of a lack of uniformity in
data-privacy law among multiple distinct nations within its
own borders. Thus, illustrating the global issues that stem
from diverging data-privacy legislation on a micro level and
demonstrating a possible solution that if applied more broadly
can alleviate these issues on a global level.37 The EU has been
proactive about both establishing and improving laws to create
a cohesive uniform body of law to protect the personal data of
its citizens.38 This will be illustrated by first looking at the orig-
inal piece of data-privacy legislation that the EU established,
the EU Directive, and by reviewing the newly adopted General
Data Protection Regulation and its attempts to improve the EU
Directive.
1. The EU Directive
The right to privacy has long been recognized as a fundamen-
tal right within the EU.39 In order to protect this right, the EU
recognized the need to harmonize data-privacy laws and there-
by remove barriers to the free flow of data that derived from
differing legislation of its member countries.40 In order to facili-
tate this harmonization, the EU Directive imposes mandatory
standards for the collection, processing, and transfer of person-
al data throughout the EU.41 In October 1995, the EU present-
ed its first piece of legislation on data-privacy protection, the
EU Directive.42 The EU Directive provides two main objectives:
(1) that personal data privacy be treated and protected as a
37. This Note will not provide a comprehensive overview of every law af-
fecting data privacy in each region of the world. There are countless laws in
each country that in some way or form relate to data privacy. Rather, this
Note focuses on the most significant sources of authority on data-privacy law
in order to demonstrate the general policy approaches each region has taken
on data privacy.
38. See generally Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31–39 (EC).
39. The right to privacy is viewed as such under “Article 8 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Humans Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and in the general principles of Community law.” Id. at pmbl.
40. Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the
Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217, 1222 (2013).
41. See generally Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38.
42. Id.
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fundamental right43 and (2) to prevent the restriction of the
free flow of data across the borders of member states.44
The EU Directive intended to articulate a set of bare-
minimum standards that each Member State must provide for
its citizens, while bestowing them with flexibility in how they
may implement these standards.45 The EU Directive instructed
each Member State to enact their own legislation based on
its enumerated requirements.46 Therefore, the EU Directive
allowed each Member State to enact legislation that could pro-
vide for even stricter data-privacy protection than that which is
provided for by the EU Directive.47 In order to promote uni-
formity, the EU Directive provides definitions of key data-
privacy terms in attempts to ensure no contradictions arise in
the laws of each Member State.48
The EU Directive imposes strict conditions on the collection
of personal data.49 Data may only be collected for specific, legit-
imate, and explicit purposes.50 Furthermore, personal data that
is collected must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive” for
such purposes.51 Additionally, each Member State is responsi-
ble for ensuring the collected personal data is current and ac-
curate, as well as maintained in a form that can identify data
subjects for a period of time that is no longer than necessary.52
When personal data is stored for long periods of time, there
must be proper safeguards put in place to protect this data.53
Additionally, when an individual’s personal data is collected,
they must be afforded with information regarding the collec-
43. Id. art. 1.1.
44. Id. art. 1.2.
45. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, Stephanie Liston, Introduction to The Cloud:
Data Protection and Privacy––Whose Cloud is it Anyway? 1, 10, (Int’l Tele-
comm. Union, GSR Working Paper 2012), https://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR12/documents/GSR12_Privacy_Liston_6.pd
f.
46. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, pmbl.
47. See id.
48. For example, EU Directive defines “personal data” as any information
that relates to an identifiable or identified natural person. See id. art. 2.
49. Id. art. 6.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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tion.54 At a minimum, this must include the identity of the in-
dividual or entity determining the use and means of the data,55
the intended purpose of the collection,56 and any other infor-
mation that would “guarantee fair processing” to the data sub-
ject.57
The EU Directive also imposes strict conditions on the pro-
cessing of personal data.58 Before data can undergo any type of
processing, the data subject’s consent must be obtained.59 Even
with consent, the ability to process personal data is limited to
circumstances where the processing is necessary to further a
legitimate purpose.60 All Member States are required to im-
plement safeguards that will protect personal data from being
unlawfully disclosed, altered, destructed, or lost.61 To provide
some flexibility in this provision’s enforcement, the drafters did
not mandate that a specific system be followed in establishing
safeguards. Instead, the drafters required that all Member
States provide security that is “appropriate to the risks repre-
sented by the processing” and provide “sufficient guarantees” of
protection.62
Under the EU Directive, individuals are given a voice in es-
tablishing the safeguards of their personal information. Indi-
viduals are guaranteed the right to obtain information pertain-
ing to who is using their personal data and how it is being
used.63 The EU Directive further allows individuals to object to
the processing of their personal data based on “compelling le-
gitimate grounds,” at any time.64 When these objections are
54. Id. art. 10.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. art 7. “Processing” is defined as “any operation or set of operations
which is performed upon personal data . . . .” Id. art 2.
59. Id.
60. A list of legitimate purposes are provided by Article 7 including: per-
forming or taking steps to perform a contract to which the data subject is a
party; complying with legal obligations; protecting the “vital interests of the
data subject”; performing tasks of public interest or official authority, and
“for the purposes of legitimate interests . . . except when such interests are
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject . . . .” Id. art. 7.
61. Id. art. 17.
62. Id.
63. Id. art. 12.
64. Id. art. 14.
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justified, the processing will be discontinued.65 Individuals can
also request to have their personal data deleted as soon as its
retention is no longer necessary.66
In order to uphold the objectives of the EU Directive, each
Member State is required to establish at least one data-
protection authority (“DPA”).67 These DPAs “shall act with
complete independence in exercising the functions entrusted to
them” from any other governmental influence.68 The EU Di-
rective also provides a list of specific powers the DPAs must
possess in order to ensure they can adequately uphold the
laws.69 The DPAs are required to “cooperate with one another
to the extent necessary for performance of their duties.”70 This
requirement has successfully created a network of regulators
that have “become a center of knowledge and core for a com-
munity of professionals devoted to data protection.”71
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 12.
67. Tene, supra note 40, at 1223.
68. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, art. 28; see also Steve Peers,
The CJEU Confirms the Independence of Data Protection Authorities Devel-
opments, EU L. ANALYSIS (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/the-cjeu-confirms-independence-
of-data.html.
69. The EU Directive requires that the DPAs be afforded with both inves-
tigative powers and collective powers, allowing them to access information for
performing their duties. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, art. 28. It
further requires the DPAs be afforded with the powers of intervention, which
include the power to deliver opinions prior to data processing operations tak-
ing place, the ability to order data controllers to block, erase, or destruct da-
ta, and the ability to place bans on their processing of data altogether. Id.
Furthermore, under the EU Directive, each DPA must be afforded with “the
power to engage in legal proceedings where the national provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive have been violated or to bring these violations to
the attention of the judicial authorities.” Id. In addition to these powers,
when EU citizens object to the use of their personal data, they will bring such
claims before these authorities. Id. Once the DPAs issue decisions, they can
be appealed through the local courts. Id. Additionally, the DPAs are also
posed with the duty to issue regular reports to inform the public of recent
activities. Id. The EU Directive requires Member States provide for DPA
members and staff to maintain confidentiality regarding the information ac-
cessed through the position both during the operation and after leaving their
positions. Id.
70. Id.
71. Tene, supra note 40, at 1223. For a list of all of the DPAs in the EU,
see List of Data Protection Bodies by Country, EURO. COMM’N,
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The EU Directive also established the Article 29 Working
Party (“Working Party”) to act independently in advising the
Member States on how to apply the directive.72 Since the EU
Directive’s enactment, the Working Party has become “a very
important platform for cooperation.”73 The Working Party has
become such a platform by providing expert advice on data pro-
tection issues, promoting uniform application of the EU Di-
rective, and advising the European Commission (EC) on how
EU laws are affecting the right to personal-data privacy.74
In creating the EU Directive, drafters emphasized the im-
portance of the free flow of data throughout the twenty-eight
Member States, believing it to be essential to the efficiency of
the EU’s internal market.75 To facilitate the free flow of data,
no Member State may “inhibit the free movement between
them of personal data on grounds relating to protection of the
rights and freedoms of individuals, and in particular the right
to privacy.”76 The rationalization behind this limitation is that
there should be no need for such protections when the EU Di-
rective is meant to provide “equivalent protection” throughout
all of the Member States.77
While most of its provisions focus on how data is handled
within the EU, the EU Directive also provides restrictions on
the transfer of data to countries outside the EU.78 Personal da-
ta may only be transferred from within the EU to non-EU
countries if such countries can ensure an “adequate level of
protection.”79 Whether a country’s protection is adequate will
be assessed based on “all the circumstances surrounding a data
transfer.”80 Important factors to consider include the nature of
the data, the purpose of the transfer, the duration of pro-
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/bodies/authorities/eu/index_en.htm
(last updated Feb. 11, 2016).
72. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, art. 29.
73. Article 29 Working Party, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR,
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/site/mySite/Art29 (last visited
Dec. 22, 2015).
74. Id.
75. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, pmbl.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 25.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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cessing, the countries involved, the rules of laws involved, and
the security measures the non-EU country complies with.81
Although this restriction was one of the most controversial
aspects of the EU Directive, EU regulators felt it was essential
in ensuring the effectiveness of the EU Directive.82 Without
such a restriction, “the very rights created under the Directive
could be systematically violated.”83 Had such a restriction not
been incorporated, organizations could freely remove data from
the borders of the EU to process it in locations that are not sub-
ject to the EU Directive, thereby circumventing its require-
ments and removing the rights and protections it affords.84
Nonetheless, U.S.-based multinational and e-commerce organi-
zations objected to this restriction out of fear that in the event
that U.S. data-privacy law was found to be inadequate, it
would create a barrier inhibiting the flow of data from the EU
to U.S. businesses.85
Despite the many attributes of the EU Directive, the level of
flexibility it permitted in implementing national legislation led
to differing and, at times, even conflicting regimes throughout
the EU.86 In some cases, these disparities are attributable to
certain Member States failing to implement the EU Directive
properly. 87 In other cases, the different policy choices each
Member State made when creating their own legislation led to
the creation of very different and inconsistent laws.88 The re-
sulting inconsistencies have created unnecessary costs and di-
minished the overall effectiveness of the EU Directive.89 De-
spite years of effort, these issues have not been remedied.90
81. Id.
82. Assey & Eleftherious, supra note 18, at 146.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Tene, supra note 40, at 1224.
87. Peter Hustinx, EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive
95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation 24–25, EUR.
DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Docume
nts/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2014/14-09-15_Article_EUI_EN.pdf.
88. Id. at 26–27.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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2. The General Data Protection Regulation
As technology evolves, the EU continues to update data-
privacy laws to ensure adequate protection for its citizens.91 In
January 2012, the EC adopted the proposal of a new regulation
to replace the EU Directive—the GDPR.92 The GDPR would
function as a “comprehensive reform of the EU’s 1995 data pro-
tection rules to strengthen online privacy rights and boost Eu-
rope’s digital economy.” 93 After extensive negotiations, the
91. One effort involved the passing of the Directive on Privacy and Elec-
tronic Communication, which took the principles from the EU Directive and
created specific rules for the telecommunications sector. Council Directive
97/66, 1997 O.J. (L 024) 0001 (EC). In 2002, this Directive was replaced by
the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communication (“ePrivacy Di-
rective”). Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 0037 (EC) at pmbl. The
e-Privacy Directive updated the rules promulgated by Directive 97/66 to com-
port with new developments in technology. Id. The e-Privacy Directive directs
Member States to produce national legislation that requires communications
made over public networks be kept confidential and obliges all providers of
telecommunications services to implement adequate security to protect users’
personal data Id. The e-Privacy Directive specifically deals with two new are-
as of concern that grew out of growing patterns of the Internet: Spam mail
and the use of cookies. See id. (“So-called spyware, web bugs, hidden identifi-
ers and other similar devices can enter the user’s terminal without their
knowledge in order to gain access to information, to store hidden information
or to trace the activities of the user and may seriously intrude upon the pri-
vacy of these users.”). Another significant development to the EU’s data-
privacy regime is the creation of the “Right to be Forgotten” by the Court of
Justice of the European Union in 2014, which affords EU citizens the right to
instruct search engines to remove links containing their personal information
where it is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive for the purposes
of the data processing . . . .” Eur. Comm’n, Factsheet on the “Right to be For-
gotten: Ruling (C-131/12), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf (last visited Mar.
8, 2016).
92. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protec-
tion Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
93. Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection
Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Business-
es, EUROPEANCOMM’N (Jan. 25 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
12-46_en.htm?locale=en.
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GDPR was adopted on April 14, 2016,94 and will go into effect
in early 2018.95
The GDPR makes some key changes to the current law of the
EU.96 One significant change is that an entirely different legal
instrument—a regulation, rather than a directive—will be used
to govern data in the EU.97 As is the nature of directives, the
EU Directive served merely as a framework and minimum
standard for countries to use when drafting their own laws.98
Acknowledging the inconsistencies that resulted from Member
States’ implementation of the EU Directive, the Council of the
EU expressed the need to reform EU data-privacy legislation in
order to more effectively meet the goals set out by the EU Di-
rective:
The objectives and principles of [the EU Directive] remain
sound, but it has not prevented fragmentation in the way da-
ta protection is implemented across the [EU], legal uncertain-
ty and a widespread public perception that there are signifi-
cant risks for the protection of individuals associated notably
with online activity. Differences in the level of protection of
the rights and freedoms of individuals, notably to the right to
the protection of personal data, with regard to the processing
of personal data afforded in the Member States may prevent
the free flow of personal data throughout the [EU]. These dif-
ferences may therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of
economic activities at the level of the [EU], distort competi-
tion and impede authorities in the discharge of their respon-
sibilities under [EU] law. This difference in levels of protec-
tion is due to the existence of differences in the implementa-
tion and application of [the EU Directive].99
94. Press Release, Joint Statement on the Final Adoption of the New EU
Rules for Personal Data Protection, EUR. COMM’N, (Apr. 14, 2016)
http://europea.eu/rapid.press-release_STATEMENT-16-1403_en/htm.
95. Id.
96. See generally Andy Green, The EU General Data Protection Regulation
Is Now Law. Here’s What You Need to Know, INSIDE OUT SECURITY BLOG (Jan.
15, 2016), http://blog.varonis.com/the-eu-general-data-protection-regulation-
is-now-law-heres-what-you-need-to-know/.
97. Id.
98. Dan Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law—Its
Theoretical Justification and its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses, 50 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 53, 68 (2014).
99. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal
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In order to ameliorate the inconsistencies amongst different
national laws that resulted from Member States implementing
the EU Directive in their own way, the GDPR will automatical-
ly bind all EU-Member States to its specific requirements once
enacted.100
Another major change is the fact that the GDPR explicitly
encompasses personal data that is handled outside the EU. The
GDPR asserts authority over companies who offer their ser-
vices to EU citizens and play an active role in the EU mar-
ket.101 Although the EU Directive also had an extraterritorial
effect, it had never explicitly identified its jurisdiction as ex-
tending beyond the EU. 102 Instead, it banned EU members
from conducting business with non-EU members who did not
provide an adequate level of protection, which in turn encom-
passed entities beyond the EU’s borders.103 This change em-
phasizes the fact that the EU will not allow its citizens’ person-
al information to be afforded with anything less than the rights
the EU provides.
This reform demonstrates the willingness of the EU to con-
tinue to improve its laws in order to ensure privacy protection
for EU members.104 Despite the presence of protective legisla-
tion, the need for such an improvement also demonstrates the
persistence of data-privacy concerns when there is a lack of
uniformity in the law.
B. United States
The U.S. approach to data privacy is vastly different from the
extensive framework found in the EU. The United States has
taken a sectoral approach to data privacy.105 The U.S. approach
delegates the majority of data-privacy protection to self-
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regu-
lation) – Preparation of a General Approach, 9565/15 (June 11, 2015).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Edward R. Alo, EU Privacy Protection: A Step Towards Global Pri-
vacy, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 1095, 1120–21 (2013).
103. Id.
104. See European Commission Memo MEMO/14/186, Progress on EU Data
Protection Reform Now Irreversible Following European Parliament Vote
(Mar. 12, 2014).
105. Ryan Moshell, Comment, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook
for a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Compre-
hensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 372 (2005).
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regulation by individual industries. Legislation only steps in to
fix narrowly tailored issues within specific industries.106 This
hands-off approach juxtaposes the EU’s approach of enacting
broad-sweeping legislation that aims to counter all data-
privacy issues in all industries.107 Some scholars have attribut-
ed the United States’ lack of legislation in this area to the fact
that privacy rights were not written directly into the U.S. Con-
stitution.108 Whereas, in the EU, privacy is expressly provided
as an individual’s right within the EU’s constitution.109 In the
United States, privacy rights were eventually read in through
the courts’ interpretation of the Bill of Rights, resulting in
piecemeal privacy rights for U.S. citizens.110
1. Statutory Framework of the United States
In the United States, there is no single federal law that gov-
erns the protection of all sensitive data.111 The U.S. legislature
has shown a general reluctance toward enacting broad protec-
tions for data privacy.112 Instead, there is a fragmentation of
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7, Dec. 18,
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
110. Moshell, supra note 105, at 372. The Fourth Amendment grants “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Courts
have shown a general reluctance toward using this protection over data that
is provided to a third party. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 433
(1976) (“The Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed”). These privacy rights have
only been enforced against the government and only in cases where an indi-
vidual had a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Alo, supra note 102, at
1101.
111. GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL
INFORMATION SECURITY ANDDATA BREACHNOTIFICATION LAWS 1 (2010).
112. For example, in U.S. v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that a bank
customer was not protected by the Fourth Amendment after his personal in-
formation was given to a government agency because he assumed the risk of
disclosure. 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). The Legislature reacted to the decision
by enacting the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422
(2015). The Act restricts financial institutions in handing over their custom-
er’s information to government agencies. Id. § 3402. The law is tailored to-
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statutes, which provide limited, sector-specific protections to
personal data.113 As a result, there is more than one definition
of “personally identifiable information” found in U.S. law.114 In
order to determine which laws govern an entity’s data-security
practices, one must look at what sector the entity belongs to
and the type of data the entity collects.115
In addition to federal laws, there are state laws that affect
data privacy. One significant form of state law is data-breach
notification statutes, which can be found in the majority of
states.116 Generally, these statutes require companies to notify
consumers when their personal data becomes compromised due
to a data breach.117 Such “breach occurs when there is a loss or
theft of, or other unauthorized access to, data containing sensi-
ward a specific issue in a specific industry, thus avoiding the unresolved issue
of data privacy that is generally left open by Miller. Moshell supra note 105,
at 373.
113. Alo, supra note 102, at 1103. Examples of these sector-specific laws
include the Gramm Leach Bliley Financial Modernization Act. Pub. L. No.
106-012, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (regulating data processing within the finan-
cial industry); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681 (1994 & Supp.
1998) (regulating data relating to employment and credit reporting agencies);
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
100 Stat. 1936 (1996) (regulating data collection in the health care industry).
Another law that is narrowly applicable to a specific set of individuals is the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506,
which regulates the collection and use of children’s information by web-
sites. COPPA applies to an “operator of a website or online service directed to
children, or any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting per-
sonal information from a child.” Id.
114. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Infor-
mation in the United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 879
(2014).
115. STEVENS, supra note 111, at 1.
116. Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands have enacted such laws. Security Breach Notification
Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 11, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
117. Id. Each law at least addresses how it defines “personal information”
and “security breach,” who must be notified after a data breach occurs, how
individuals must be notified, what information must be included within the
notification, timing requirements for notification, and the penalties for failing
to satisfy the requirements. Jacqueline May Tom, A Simple Compromise: The
Need for a Federal Data Breach Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1569,
1577 (2010).
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tive personal information that results in the potential compro-
mise of the confidentiality or integrity of data.”118
Because these notification laws are enacted by each state
individually, each statute has different requirements.119 This
creates difficulties for businesses that operate across state bor-
ders, as they need to know which citizens must be notified un-
der varying circumstances, and must constantly keep up with
the amendments to each statute.120 Scholars often argue for a
federal security breach notification law as a means to fix
this problem.121 However, although a number of bills have
been proposed to create a federal data breach law, none have
been enacted.122
In the past few years, despite the force of the state notifica-
tion laws, an alarming amount of data breaches have taken
place within the United States.123 An analysis of the costs asso-
ciated with data breaches throughout the world revealed that
American businesses faced the highest average total cost of da-
ta breaches compared to companies of any other country, aver-
aging at $6.53 million in 2015.124
2. The FTC
The Federal Trade Commission Act was created on Septem-
ber 26, 1914, establishing the FTC as a U.S. agency with the
118. STEVENS, supra note 111, at 1.
119. Tom, supra note 117, at 1570 (“Variations are so numerous that it is
virtually impossible to convert these state laws into the more manageable
format of fifty-state surveys.”).
120. See STEVENS, supra note 111, at 2.
121. Id. See generally Tom, supra note 117, at 1574.
122. Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2011, S. 1207, 112th
Cong. (2011); Data Breach Notification Act of 2011, S. 1408, 112th Cong.
(2011); Data Security Act of 2011, S. 1434, 112th Cong. (2011); Personal Data
Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2011, S. 1535, 112th Cong.
(2011); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 1707, 112th Cong. (2011);
Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. (2011);
Secure and Fortify Electronic Data Act, H.R. 2577, 112th Cong. (2011). The
most recent attempt to create a federal data breach law was introduced in the
Senate on January 13, 2015, where it was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Data Security and
Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. (2015).
123. Russo, supra note 10, at 201.
124. Ponemon Inst., 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis 7
(May 2015), https://nhlearningsolutions.com/Portals/0/Documents/2015-Cost-
of-Data-Breach-Study.PDF.
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mission of protecting consumers and promoting competition.125
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“Section
5”), the FTC has the power to protect consumers against “un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”126
To combat the harm associated with data breaches, the FTC
has taken the role of enforcing more secure data-protection
practices amongst U.S. businesses.127 It was not until 1995,
when the FTC’s involvement with consumer privacy issues be-
gan.128 At that time, the FTC promoted the idea of industries
self-regulating data protection.129 After realizing this was an
ineffective method, however, the FTC reported to Congress that
self-regulation was inadequate and began bringing its own en-
forcement actions to strengthen data-security practices.
The FTC first started using its Section 5 authority through
the “deceptive acts” prong of the statute, by taking action
against businesses that violated their own policies, deeming
such violations to be deceptive practices.130 Since 2002, the FTC
has used the unfairness prong to bring actions against compa-
nies who use unfair practices relating to data security, as-
sessing such practices on a case-by-case basis.131
As a result of the international nature of the Internet, the
Undertaking Spam, Spyware, And Fraud Enforcement With
Enforcers beyond Borders Act of 2006 (SAFE WEB Act) was
passed to amend the FTC Act to provide the FTC with the au-
125. Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-
history (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
126. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (West 2006).
127. Russo, supra note 10, at 201.
128. GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43723, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION’SREGULATION OFDATA SECURITYUNDER ITSUNFAIR ORDECEPTIVE
ACT OR PRACTICES (UDAP) AUTHORITY pmbl. (2014).
129. Id.
130. STEVENS, supra note 111, pmbl.
131. Russo, supra note 10, at 201. In order to prove business practices are
unfair, the FTC must show that these practices “cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves” and
that this harm is not “outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (West 2006). Whether consumers could
have avoided the injury depends on whether the consumers’ choice was fully
informed and free. F.T.C. v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F. 3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010).
Businesses can also be found in violation of the Act in cases where they do
not directly cause harm to consumers but their practices “facilitate or con-
tribute to” such harm. Id. at 1157. Under these circumstances, the FTC must
prove that the injury was foreseeable. Id. at 1156–58.
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thority needed to protect consumers against “cross-border fraud
and deception, and particularly to fight spam, spyware, and
Internet fraud and deception.”132 In addition to providing the
FTC with authority to work with foreign governments on these
matters,133 the act amends the definition of “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices” to include “acts or practices involving foreign
commerce that: “(i) cause or are likely to cause reasonably fore-
seeable injury within the United States; or (ii) involve material
conduct occurring within the United States.”134
In addition to bringing enforcement actions, the FTC has
made a continuing effort to educate businesses on acceptable
data-protection practices.135 In March 2012, the FTC released a
report136 addressing “privacy challenges associated with the
new technological and business landscape.”137 The report estab-
lishes the best practices for businesses to protect the privacy of
American consumers and give them “greater control over the
collection and use of their personal data.”138 The FTC explored
new privacy issues that have arisen due to growths in technol-
ogy and business developments, looking to public opinion to
help shape the report.139 The report goes on to propose three
pieces of legislation to Congress: a general privacy statute, a
data broker statute, and a federal data security and breach no-
tification law.140
Additionally, the FTC publishes all of its enforcement actions
and issues press releases, which allow businesses to view what
the FTC considers unacceptable data-security practices. 141
132. Pub. L. No. 109-455, codified to the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.
133. See generally id. at §§ 4–6.
134. Id. § 3.
135. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A GUIDE
FOR BUSINESS (2011) [hereinafter 2011 REPORT],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus69-protecting-
personal-information-guide-business_0.pdf (iterating the “best practices” for
businesses to use when collecting personal data, as well as providing general
principles for creating strong data-security plans).
136. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 1
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 REPORT].
137. Tene, supra note 40, at 1234–35.
138. 2012 REPORT, supra note 136, at i.
139. Tene, supra note 40, at 1234–35.
140. See generally 2012 REPORT, supra note 136.
141. Enforcing Privacy Promises, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-
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Nonetheless, the FTC itself has acknowledged its inability to
require businesses to adopt a set of privacy practices.142 There-
fore, this guidance is only useful if companies voluntarily im-
plement security standards in accordance with these recom-
mendations. Recently, however, the significance of these rec-
ommendations was emphasized by the Third Circuit.
In August 2015, the Third Circuit issued an opinion in FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., where the FTC’s authority over
data-security practices was challenged.143 The FTC filed suit
against the hotel, alleging that the hotel’s conduct constituted
an unfair practice, after data hackers stole personal and finan-
cial information from Whyndam’s customers and consequently
accumulated $10.6 million in fraudulent charges.144 Additional-
ly, the FTC alleged that Wyndham’s privacy policy was decep-
tive because it overstated the cybersecurity practices the hotel
had in place.145 Wyndham moved to dismiss the case, arguing
that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority by asserting un-
fairness in the context of data security. Although the FTC has
been using Section 5 to bring such actions for over a decade,
Congress had never explicitly delegated it with the specific au-
thority to regulate data security.146 Instead, the FTC simply
started applying its broad Section 5 authority to govern the ar-
ea.147 Until recently, most of the FTC’s data-security cases have
been settled or abandoned, leaving little judicial guidance re-
garding the FTC’s power to regulate data-security practices.148
With the issuance of this decision, the Third Circuit affirmed
the FTC’s ability to “regulate cybersecurity using the unfair-
ness prong” of Section 5,149 affirmatively setting in motion what
seems to be a major shift in the U.S. policy on data security.
Although this case provides a significant step forward in es-
tablishing a policy in favor of stronger data-privacy protection,
privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises (last visited Mar. 10, 2016); Cases and
Proceedings, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
142. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 240.
145. Id. at 241.
146. STEVENS, supra note 130, at 2, 4.
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 248.
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it highlights the lack of clarity that still exists in this area of
the law. The Court itself “acknowledge[d] there will be border-
line cases where it is unclear if a particular company’s con-
duct falls below the requisite legal threshold.”150 The Court
also went on to suggest that, although not required by law,
companies should look to the recommendations the FTC has
issued as a means to achieve privacy standards that would not
violate the statute.151 However, these recommendations remain
solely recommendations and therefore are not useful unless
every business voluntarily complies with them in setting up
their own data-security practices.152
Since the FTC cannot require companies to adopt safe data-
security standards, its ability to regulate this area is limited to
enforcing policies that companies have already adopted. 153
Therefore, it can only address major deficiencies in protection
once individuals’ personal information has been threatened.
Furthermore, the FTC is limited in what individuals it can pro-
tect and what entities it can take action against. Its authority
only allows for the protection of consumers, and such protection
does not extend over various sectors that are governed by other
statutes.154 Additionally, the FTC deals with a broader scope of
150. Id. at 256. The Court explained that this standard is sufficient because
it alerts parties that they need to apply a cost-benefit analysis, which “con-
siders a number of relevant factors, including the probability and expected
size of reasonably unavoidable harms to consumers given a certain level of
cybersecurity and the costs to consumers that would arise from investment in
stronger cybersecurity.” Id. at 255–56.
151. Id. at 257–59.
152. See Alo, supra note 102, at 1103. The FTC has taken a variety of steps
to try and educate businesses on acceptable data protection practices. In
2011, it issued a report which iterates the “best practices” for businesses to
use when collecting personal data, and provides general principles for creat-
ing a strong data security plan. 2011 REPORT, supra note 135. It has also is-
sued a statement to outline its approach to data security, establishing its
standard of assessment as “reasonableness.” See generally Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Commission Statement Marking the FTC’s 50th Data Security,
FTC.GOV (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf.
153. Alo, supra note 102, at 1103.
154. Tene, supra note 40, at 1225. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2015), does not grant the FTC with authority over “finan-
cial institutions (which are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve
Board); common carriers (subject to the Federal Communications Commis-
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issues than just data privacy. Therefore, data-privacy concerns
are competing for the FTC’s attention against other prevalent
issues affecting commerce.155
3. Additional U.S. Data-Privacy Efforts
In addition to the FTC’s promotion of a stronger data-privacy
policy, other branches of government are stepping forward and
calling for national legislation. In February 2012, the Obama
administration released a White House Report156 recommend-
ing Congress enact legislation to protect the privacy of con-
sumers.157 The report also proposes that the United States
put effort toward improving cooperation with the interna-
tional community in the realm of data privacy.158 Acknowl-
edging the timeliness for such a change, President Obama
asserts,
even though we live in a world in which we share personal in-
formation more freely than in the past, we must reject the
conclusion that privacy is an outmoded value. It has been at
the heart of our democracy from its inception, and we need it
now more than ever.159
Additionally, the Department of Commerce (DOC) has recently
called for stronger privacy legislation. After two years of con-
ducting public workshops and research on how to provide for
the protection of consumer privacy in a manner that would
promote innovation, the DOC issued its final “White Paper” on
February 23, 2012. The White Paper recommends Congress
enact a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.160
In addition to these proposals, the U.S. private sector has
been noticeably proactive in trying to enhance the industry
standards for data-privacy practices.161 Companies such as Fa-
sion); air carriers; insurance companies; and non-profit organizations.” Tene
supra note 40, at 1225 n. 29.
155. See id.
156. THEWHITEHOUSE, CONSUMERDATA PRIVACY IN ANETWORKEDWORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 32 n.39 (2012) [hereinafter WHITEHOUSE REPORT],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. WHITEHOUSEREPORT, supra note 156.
160. 2012 REPORT, supra note 136, at 3.
161. Id. at 7.
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cebook and Google have enhanced their practices to protect us-
ers’ passwords from being stolen.162 Additionally, tools have
been created to afford users with enhanced privacy, such as the
HTTPS Everywhere browser add-on, as well as other tools that
allow users to encrypt their information.163 Furthermore, after
the FTC’s preliminary report called for the industry to create “a
mechanism to allow consumers to control the collection and use
of their online browsing data,” Do-Not-Track (“DNT”) technolo-
gy164 has been created and widely adopted throughout the
private sector.165 Data-privacy proponents “argue consumers
should be allowed to submit ‘Do Not Track’ requests to tell a
website not to collect information about their online browsing
habits.”166 Despite the noticeable improvement in the private
sector’s perspective on consumer privacy protection, complying
with these requests remains completely voluntary.167
Efforts have been made to pass legislation to require online
services to honor users’ DNT requests, however, to date, none
have been enacted.168 Attempts have also been made to bring
DNT technology under the authority of the Federal Communi-
cations Committee (FCC).169 However, by dismissing a petition
requesting the FCC initiate a rulemaking proceeding to force
companies to honor these DNT requests, the FCC rejected the
opportunity to provide any standard to apply to DNT technolo-
gy.170 Therefore, no legal obligation currently exists requiring
websites to honor DNT requests, further signifying the need for
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. DNT is a technology that enables users to opt-out of tracking by web-
sites they do not visit, including analytics services, advertising networks, and
social platforms. Overview, DO NOT TRACK, http://donottrack.us (last visited
Dec. 22, 2015). DNT signals a user’s opt-out preference with an HTTP head-
er, a simple technology that is completely compatible with the existing web.
Id. Generally, they are in the preferences section of your web browser. Id.
However, not all websites honor these signals. Id.
165. Id.
166. Dustin Volz, U.S. Regulators Reject Push For “Do Not Track” Internet
Rules, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-tech-
tracking-idUSL1N1311XW20151106#FDfeJz1gIPLCp972.99.
167. Id.
168. Do-Not-Track Online Act, S. 913 112th Cong. (2011).
169. Consumer Watchdog Petition for Rulemaking to Require Edge Provid-
ers to Honor ‘Do Not Track’ Requests, 30 F.C.C.R. 12424 (Nov. 6, 2015).
170. Id.
2016] Data-Privacy Convention: Cue from the CISG 745
a legal instrument to force companies to comply with such
practices.
Despite these setbacks, DNT has not been completely ignored
by the law. California has been at the forefront of privacy pro-
tection for years, stemming back to the 1970s, when “[v]oters
amended the state constitution . . . to provide explicit privacy
rights far more robust than those guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.”171 As a result, California has been a trailblazer
for enacting data-privacy legislation.172 On September 27, 2013,
California enacted a progressive piece of legislation governing
disclosure requirements with regard to DNT signals. 173 Alt-
hough the law does not compel companies to adopt the practice
of abiding by user’s DNT requests, it forces them to disclose
such fact so users are aware their requests are being ignored
while using the company’s website.174
On October 8, 2015—notably two days following the invalida-
tion of the Safe Harbor—the Electronic Communications Priva-
cy Act was enacted in California and has since been hailed as
landmark legislation.175 The statute will prohibit government
entities from compelling businesses to provide access to, or
turn over, any “electronic communication information or elec-
tronic device information, . . . without a search warrant, wire-
tap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena is-
sued pursuant under specified conditions” absent an emergency
171. Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law,
WIRED (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-
best-digital-privacy-law/.
172. California “amended the state constitution in the 1970s to provide ex-
plicit privacy rights far more robust than those guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment of the US Constitution.” Id. Other comprehensive legislation
demonstrates California’s progressive privacy approach. CAL CIV. CODE §
1798.83–.84 (West 2015) (requiring businesses to provide customers with
information regarding how their personal information is shared for market-
ing purposes); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–22582 (West 2015) (requir-
ing websites to allow minors to remove online content which they have posted
on websites); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(1)–(3) (West 2015) (provid-
ing strict disclosure requirements for companies regarding their collection
and use of users’ personal information).
173. Cal. Assembly Bill 370, pmbl. (Sept. 27, 2013) (amending Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code §§ 22575–22579).
174. Id.
175. California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Cal. S. Bill 178,
(Oct. 8, 2015); Zetter, supra note 171.
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situation.176 This piece of legislation has already gained the
support of major industry leaders such as Google, Facebook,
Apple, LinkedIn, Dropbox, and Twitter.177 California’s recogni-
tion that protection is needed from government surveillance
places California’s policy more in line with the EU’s view on
privacy policy than current U.S. federal law.178 Proponents of
this legislation aspire for it to serve as a model for the rest of
the states to follow in implementing similar legislation.179 Pri-
vacy proponents hope other states will begin to follow suit and
that federal law will eventually catch up with state law.180
In addition to these improvements, the United States has re-
cently been demonstrating a noticeable increase in its partici-
pation in the realm of international data privacy,181 thus signi-
fying a ripening opportunity for international cooperation in
this area of law. The FTC expressed that “there is value in
greater interoperability among data-privacy regimes as con-
sumer data is increasingly transferred around the world.”182
This recognition provides a window of opportunity for a more
cooperative approach to dealing with this problem.
II. PAST EFFORTS TOWARD COOPERATION
Despite the challenges presented, the desire to allow for the
free flow of data on an international level has continued to
promote global cooperation in the data-privacy realm. This
Part will first explore the Safe Harbor Agreement, demonstrat-
ing how the EU and United States have made an effort to pre-
serve the free flow of data between these locations, despite
their contrasting approaches to data-privacy law. It will then
proceed to explore why the Safe Harbor failed, and how these
regions are planning to move forward with the newly agreed-
176. California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Cal. S. Bill 178,
pmbl. para. (1) (Oct. 8, 2015).
177. Each of these companies have headquarters in California and therefore
are governed by California law. Zetter, supra note 171.
178. See id.
179. Zetter, supra note 171.
180. Id.
181. Recently, the United States has engaged in several international coop-
erative efforts in the realm of data privacy, including the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC), the International Conference of Privacy and Data
Protection Commissioners, the OECD, and GPEN. Tene, supra note 40, at
1226.
182. 2012 REPORT, supra note 136, at 10.
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upon Privacy Shield. Subsequently, this Part will explore the
OECD’s role in data privacy, which has spanned decades. It
will look at the organization’s contribution of guidelines, and
how these guidelines provide an accepted set of principles for
data privacy around the world. Finally, this section will look at
the development of GPEN, its contributions to data-privacy en-
forcement around the world, and its significance toward global
cooperation in this area of law.
A. The Safe Harbor Agreement
When the EU Directive was passed, barring personal data
transfers with non-EU countries who lack adequate data secu-
rity standards, the ability for U.S. companies to continue doing
business within the EU was threatened.183 Due to the likeli-
hood that U.S. law would be found to not provide “an adequate
level of protection” under the EU Directive’s assessment crite-
ria, U.S. organizations became posed with the dilemma of ei-
ther implementing new and costly data-privacy practices or po-
tentially losing the opportunity to receive important data from
entities within the EU.184 As a result, negotiations commenced
between EU and U.S. officials to create a set of principles that
would afford U.S. organizations with an alternative means to
meet the requirements of the EU Directive.185
In 2000, the Safe Harbor was created, providing seven prin-
ciples for U.S. organizations to follow when implementing data-
security practices: (1) “Notice,” which involves keeping individ-
uals notified about the use of their personal information; (2)
“Choice,” allowing individuals to choose not to have their per-
sonal information disclosed to third parties or used for extrane-
ous purposes; (3) “Onward Transfer,” which requires companies
to make sure that third parties they transfer personal infor-
mation to, themselves, have adequate protection standards; (4)
“Access” requiring the right for individuals to access their per-
sonal information and make corrections; (5) “Security” requir-
ing that there must be reasonable safeguards in place to pro-
tect personal data from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access,
disclosure, alteration and destruction;” (6) “Data Integrity,”
which calls for data usage to be relevant and ensures the data
183. International Privacy Issues, supra note 36, at 5.
184. Assey & Eleftherious, supra note 18, at 147.
185. Id.
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being used is accurate; and (7) “Enforcement,” which requires
that there are mechanisms in place for reporting complaints,
resolving issues, remedying problems, and punishing violations
with sufficient sanctions to deter future violations.186 By sub-
mitting to follow these principles, U.S. organizations were pur-
portedly aligning their data-privacy practices with the re-
quirements of the EU Directive.187
Four months after the Safe Harbor was announced, the EC
adopted a decision recognizing that the Safe Harbor provides
“an adequate level of protection” for personal data that is
transferred from the EU to the United States.188 Following this
announcement, the DOC began accepting applications from
U.S. companies to submit to the program.189 Submitting to
the program was completely voluntary. 190 Once a company
submitted itself to the Safe Harbor, violations of the standards
became actionable under the Federal Trade Commission Act
and punishable by sanctions.191 Consequently, the FTC played
an important role in upholding this program, placing even
more weight on the FTC’s role in monitoring data-privacy prac-
tices in the United States.
For fifteen years, the EC’s decision on the Safe Harbor re-
mained sound law. On October 6, 2015, however, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) issued a decision in Maximillian
Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (“ECJ Decision”) de-
claring this program invalid.192 The ECJ held that “the Com-
186. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK: A GUIDE TO
SELF-CERTIFICATION (Mar. 2013)
http://www.export.gov/build/groups/public/@eg_main/@safeharbor/documents/
webcontent/eg_main_061613.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR
FRAMEWORK].
187. See Assey & Eleftherious, supra note 18, at 147.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. International Privacy Issues, supra note 36, at 5. More than three
thousand U.S. companies have voluntarily submitted. Determann & Gutten-
berg, supra note 1, at 879.
191. Determann & Guttenberg, supra note 1, at 879.
192. The case was brought by an Austrian citizen bringing a claim with an
Irish DPA regarding Facebook’s transfer of his personal data from Europe to
servers within the United States. Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v.
Data Protection Commissioner, 2015 E.C.R. 117/15. His claim alleged that in
light of the Snowden revelations “the law and practice of the United States do
not offer sufficient protection against surveillance by the public authorities of
the data transferred to that country.” Id. He brought this complaint to the
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mission was required to find that the United States in fact en-
sures, by reason of its domestic law or international commit-
ments, a level of protection of fundamental rights essentially
equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU under the” EU
Directive.193 The ECJ found that the EC failed to make such a
finding because it only looked at the Safe Harbor scheme.194
The ECJ Decision also noted one of the flaws of the Safe Har-
bor was the fact that it is only applicable to U.S. entities that
voluntarily agreed to it, and therefore U.S. government author-
ities are not subject to the Safe Harbor.195 It furthered that be-
cause of this limitation, the national security, public interest,
and law enforcement requirements of the United States will
always prevail over and interfere with the requirements of the
Safe Harbor, especially in light of the lack of rules or legal pro-
tections to prevent such interference.196 Additionally, the ECJ
Decision addressed the Snowden revelations, stating that “leg-
islation permitting the public authorities to have access on a
generalized basis to the content of electronic communications
must be regarded as compromising the essence of the funda-
mental right to respect for private life.”197
The ECJ Decision further found the Safe Harbor invalid due
to the lack administrative or judicial means of redress provided
for by the United States.198 The Court found that because the
United States fails to provide a means for individuals “to pur-
sue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data re-
lating to him, or to obtain the ratification or erasure of such
data,” EU citizens’ fundamental right to effective judicial pro-
tection is compromised.199
Additionally, the ECJ declared that even where the EC has
issued a decision that found a non-EU country provided ade-
quate protection to personal data, the DPA’s powers cannot be
Irish DPA because this is where the Facebook’s server is located. Id. The
Irish DPA rejected the complaint on the grounds that the EC’s 2000 decision
already found that the United States ensures adequate protection under the
Safe Harbor. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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reduced or eliminated as a result.200 The ECJ asserted that in
order for the DPAs to perform the tasks delegated to them by
the EU Directive, they must have complete independence to
review transfers of data to non-EU countries in order to deter-
mine whether these transfers meet the requirements of the EU
Directive.201
Following the ECJ’s decision, the Working Party issued a
statement discussing the consequences of the decision, assert-
ing that any transfers taking place in the future under the Safe
Harbor will be considered unlawful.202 The Working Party once
again highlighted that “surveillance is incompatible with the
EU legal framework and that existing transfer tools are not the
solution to this issue.” 203 The statement called on Member
States to work with the United States in finding a solution,
which would allow transfers of data from the EU into the Unit-
ed States, without violating the fundamental rights of its citi-
zens.204
B. The Privacy Shield
Although the Safe Harbor was only recently invalidated, the
EU’s disappointment with the program was recognized years
before the ECJ decision was issued.205 Consequently, the EU
and United States have been negotiating a new agreement to
supplant the Safe Harbor for the past two years.206 On Febru-
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Statement of the Article 29 Working Party (WP29), EC.EUROPA.EU (Oct.
16, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-
material/press-
re-
lease/art29_press_material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_jud
gement.pdf. Following the Schrems decision, the Irish High Court now has
the task of investigating the transfer of the personal data of Facebook’s Eu-
ropean users into the United States, and deciding whether the United States
affords an adequate level of protection pursuant to the EU Directive. If the
Court finds it does not, then such transfers will be suspended. Case C-362/14,
Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, 2015 E.C.R. 117/15.
203. Statement of the Article 29 Working Party, supra note 202.
204. Id.
205. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council, COM (2013) 847 Final (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf.
206. Jowitt, supra note 22.
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ary 2, 2016, the EC announced that a new agreement had been
reached between the U.S. and EU governments called the Pri-
vacy Shield.207 On February 29, 2016, draft texts of the new
Privacy Shield were released to the public.208 On that same
day, the EC also issued a press release209 that highlighted four
key elements of the Privacy Shield that are intended to guar-
antee its compliance with the requirements of the ECJ deci-
sion: (1) “strong obligations on companies and robust enforce-
ment”; (2) “clear safeguards and transparency obligations on
U.S. government access”; (3) “[e]ffective protection of EU citi-
zens’ rights with several redress possibilities”; and (4) an
“[a]nnual joint review mechanism.”210
The first element furnishes a lot of similarities to the Safe
Harbor. Like the Safe Harbor, the Privacy Shield provides a set
of principles for U.S. organizations to follow when imple-
menting data-security standards.211 The Privacy Shield simi-
207. European Commission Press Release IP/16/216, European Commission
and United States Agree on New Framework for Transatlantic Data Flows:
EU-US Privacy Shield (Feb. 2, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-216_en.htm?locale=en.
208. U.S. Department of Commerce, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Full Text (Feb.
29, 2016) https://www.commerce.gov/privacyshield [hereinafter Draft Text].
209. European Commission Press Release IP/16/433, Restoring Trust in
Transatlantic Data Flows Through Strong Safeguards: European Commis-
sion Presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm. Within the press re-
lease the EC also mentions its negotiation of the EU-U.S. Umbrella Agree-
ment, which provides standards to safeguard data transfers between the EU
and United States for law enforcement purposes. Id. With the signing of the
Judicial Redress Act on February 24, 2015, the EU-U.S Umbrella Agreement
can now be signed and concluded. European Commission Press Release
MEMO/15/5612, Questions and Answers on the EU-US data protection “Um-
brella agreement” (Sept. 8, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-5612_en.htm; Judicial Redress Act of 2014, H.R. 1428
(Feb. 12, 2016). The passing of the Act was the final step needed by the
agreement in order to provide to EU citizens the right under the U.S. Patriot
Act of 1974 to sue the United States for the unlawful disclosure of personal
information—to EU citizens. European Commission Press Release
MEMO/15/5612.
210. European Commission Press Release IP/16/433, Restoring Trust in
Transatlantic Data Flows Through Strong Safeguards: European Commis-
sion Presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm.
211. The named principles are nearly identical to those of the Safe Harbor:
(1) “Notice”; (2) “Choice”; (3) “Accountability for Onward Transfer”; (4) “Secu-
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larly requires organizations to publicly declare their adherence
to the principles, as well as publicly provide their privacy poli-
cies that they must fully implement.212 Furthermore, like under
the Safe Harbor, U.S. organizations can voluntarily self-certify
to the DOC that they will adhere to these principles, and by
doing so, become subject to the FTC’s enforcement authority.213
The Privacy Shield, however, will also subject organizations to
the investigative and enforcement authority of the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation and other U.S. agencies “that will
effectively ensure compliance with the Principles.”214 Addition-
ally, the Privacy Shield calls for greater transparency than that
provided by the Safe Harbor and establishes oversight mecha-
nisms to ensure organizations are continuing to comply with its
requirements.215 Finally, the Privacy Shield imposes stricter
conditions on transfers of data from certified organizations to
third parties, as well as a greater potential liability from such
transfers than was imposed by the Safe Harbor.216
rity”; (5) “Data Integrity and Purpose Limitation”; (6) “Access”; and (7) “Re-
course, Enforcement and Liability.” Draft Text, supra note 208, at 4–7.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. The draft text states that “[o]rganizations and their selected independ-
ent recourse mechanisms will respond promptly to inquiries and requests by
the [DOC] for information relating to the Privacy Shield.” Id. at 7. Further-
more, those organizations who choose to work with DPAs—which is required
for those that handle human resource data—must respond directly to the
DPAs regarding EU investigations and must comply with their advice. Id. at
7, 20. Those that do not choose to work with the DPAs are still required to
respond promptly to such complaints through the DOC. Id. at 7. Additionally,
if either the FTC or a court order subjects an organization to an investigation
for not complying with the Privacy Shield, it must provide all relevant sec-
tions of their compliance or assessment reports that were submitted to the
FTC to the public (except where confidentiality requirements would be vio-
lated). Id.
216. The Privacy Shield introduces a number of new requirements that
companies must meet in order to transfer data to third parties, including that
they supply the DOC with information regarding the agreements that govern
these transfers upon the DOC’s request. Id. Furthermore, potential liability
that organizations can face has increased under the Privacy Shield, as an
organization will remain liable for any data processing done by third parties
acting as agents of the organization that is inconsistent with the Privacy
Shield unless it can prove “it is not responsible for the event giving rise to the
damage.” Id. Contrastingly, under the Safe Harbor, organizations avoided
such responsibility (assuming the transfers were done in line with the Safe
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The second element appears as an obvious response to miti-
gate the fears caused by the Snowden revelations. The U.S.
government has given the EU written assurances proclaiming
that “any access of public authorities for national security pur-
poses will be subject to clear limitations, safeguards and over-
sight mechanisms, preventing generalised access to personal
data.”217 Additionally, the U.S. governmnet committed to estab-
lishing an Ombudsperson in the Department of State, who will
act independently from any national security services in han-
dling and resolving the complaints of EU citizens regarding
U.S. national intelligence.218
The third element provides EU citizens with several avenues
of redress that were not available under the Safe Harbor. Un-
der the Privacy Shield, EU citizens can bring complaints direct-
ly to certified companies, who have to resolve them within for-
ty-five days.219 Companies are also required to provide “an in-
dependent recourse mechanism by which each individual’s
complaints and disputes can be investigated and expediously
resolved” free of charge.220 Additionally, these complaints can
be submitted to the DPAs, which the FTC has committed to
working closely with in order to respond to complaints within
ninety days.221 Finally, companies must commit to binding ar-
bitration that will be available to EU citizens to resolve com-
plaints that do not get resolved by the other redress mecha-
nisms.222
Harbor principles) unless they knew or should have known about the inap-
propriate use of personal data by the third parties. U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR
FRAMEWORK, supra note 186, at 13.
217. European Commission Press Release IP/16/433, Restoring Trust in
Transatlantic Data Flows Through Strong Safeguards: European Commis-
sion Presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm.
218. A Senior Coordinator will serve as the Ombudsperson and will desig-
nate additional officials from the DOS to assist in the performance of her du-
ties. Draft Text, supra note 208, at Annex A, 2.
219. European Commission Press Release IP/16/433, supra note 217.
220. Fact Sheet Overview of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework, DEP’T
OF COM. (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-
us_privacy_shield_fact_sheet.pdf.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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The final element—the annual joint review mechanism—is
intended to monitor the functioning of new agreement.223 The
review will be conducted by both the EC and DOC, along with
U.S. national intelligence experts and European DPAs, to as-
sess the commitments and assurances made by the United
States. 224 Additionally, the EC will hold an annual privacy
summit with interested non-governmental organizations and
stakeholders to discuss the developments of U.S. data-privacy
law and its impact on EU citizens.225
This new agreement marks a step forward in international
cooperation on personal-data privacy. Only time will tell how
successful the new agreement will be in alleviating many of the
problems that plague transfers of personal data between the
EU and United States. However, even if successful, this
agreement only governs personal data moving between these
two locations, and as a result, fails to encompass any personal
data moving throughout the rest of the world.226 To allow for
protection of all personal data, a convention encompassing a
wide inclusion of different nations is needed and the time is
ripe for its creation. With the introduction of the new agree-
ment, the DOC acknowledged that through the cooperation of
both governments, “we have the real opportunity to improve
the protection of privacy around the world.”227
C. OECD’s Efforts to Improve International Data-Privacy Issues
The OECD is an intergovernmental organization (“IGO”) that
operates under the mission of promoting “economic growth,
prosperity, and sustainable development.”228 This mission is
effectuated by bringing the governments of its thirty-four
members to work together with over seventy non-members, to
analyze commonly-held issues and compare their policies to
ultimately find solutions that can be implemented in a coordi-
nated fashion around the world.229 In accordance with this mis-
223. European Commission Press Release IP/16/433, supra note 217.
224. The EC will issue a public report on the review to both the European
Parliament and the Council. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. Draft Text, supra note 208 (letter from Secretary Pritzker).
228. About the OECD, U.S. MISSION TO THE OECD,
http://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/overview.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
229. Id.
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sion, the OECD has taken an influential role in shaping inter-
national data-privacy law, bringing forth two major contribu-
tions to the harmonization of data-privacy regimes around the
world: (1) the OECD Guidelines and (2) the recommendation to
create GPEN.
1. Background
The OECD is an IGO established in 1961.230 Its establish-
ment stemmed from the Organisation for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC), which was created in 1948 to administer
funds from the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe
following World War II.231 After participating in the OEEC,
governments of member countries came to recognize the inter-
dependence of their economies, thereby inducing a desire for
further cooperation amongst their governments.232 Additional-
ly, the acclaimed success of the OEEC attracted attention from
governments outside the EU, creating a desire for other coun-
tries to join in future cooperative efforts.233 With an eagerness
to expand the OEEC’s cooperative efforts to a broader range of
tasks and objectives, the OEEC was reconstituted as the OECD
by the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD Convention”).234
At its inception, the OECD Convention was signed by twenty
countries. Today, the OECD has a total of thirty-four member
countries, representing some of the wealthiest industrialized
230. The Convention was signed on December 14, 1960. However, the
OECD was officially created when the Convention entered into force on Sep-
tember 30, 1961. History, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
231. The Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development acted as a reconstitution of the OEEC in order to allow for the
OEEC’s “legal personality” to continue on. Article 15 of the Convention on
OECD. About, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/oecd-convention.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2016);
History, supra note 230.
232. History, supra note 230.
233. Both the United States and Canada, who were neither members of the
OEEC, nor the EU, signed the OECD Convention after witnessing the work
of the OEEC. See id.
234. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, Dec. 14, 1960 12 U.S.T. 1729, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter OECD
Convention]; About, supra note 231.
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governments in the world.235 These member countries, together
with the five nations that are recognized as active partners of
the OECD,236 presently account for 80 percent of the world’s
trade and investment.237 Despite its impressive membership,
the OECD has participated in a wide breadth of activities while
remaining “a remarkably low-profile institution” in comparison
to the more well-known IGOs, like those within the U.N. sys-
tem.238 Nonetheless, the OECD performs a variety of roles that
have led the organization to operate as “an important and
largely unrecognized role as a lawmaking body” in the past,
and continues to do so while occupying “a unique space in the
international lawmaking field.”239
One of the major roles the OECD performs is that of a “re-
search and networking organization.”240 As a research institu-
tion, the OECD employs about 2500 staff members, comprised
of economists, scientists, lawyers, and other professionals.241
These staff members “collect data, monitor trends, forecast
economic developments, and develop policy options for consid-
eration by member countries” for essentially all areas of inter-
est of member countries’ governments.242 Based on its work, the
OECD has been commended for its “ability to gather and syn-
thesize data on members’ policy initiatives and results [that]
provides a wealth of insight concerning which types of policies
work best in particular settings.”243
235. James Salzman, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment’s Role in International Law, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 255, 256
(2011). The current members consist of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slo-
venia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. About, supra note 231.
236. The partners are Brazil, India, the People’s Republic of China, Indone-
sia, and South Africa. History, supra note 230.
237. Id.
238. Salzman, supra note 235, at 255.
239. Id. at 256.
240. Id.
241. Who Does What, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/whodoeswhat/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
242. These areas include “trade, environment, agriculture, technology, taxa-
tion, education, foreign assistance, and employment.” Salzman, supra note
235, at 257.
243. Id.
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The OECD’s role as a dynamic research institution is largely
interrelated to its role as a networking organization.244 The
OECD offers unique networking opportunities to governments
due to the composition of its members and the level of privacy
it offers them.245 While OECD membership is much more re-
strictive than that of IGOs like the U.N. or the World Trade
Organization (WTO), it nonetheless covers just as broad of a
range of topics.246 On the other hand, the OECD provides an
opportunity for nations from different regions to work together
because it has a broader membership than location-centered
IGOs like the EU and the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA).247 It also offers for such an opportunity to take
place in a private setting where governments can “share expe-
riences, identify issues of common concern, and coordinate do-
mestic and international policies.”248 This is especially signifi-
cant to the field of international lawmaking because “the
closed-door meetings of the OECD provide an important alter-
native forum to what is often viewed as the developing country-
dominated and politicized U.N. system.”249
Another unique characteristic of the OECD that “offers
enormous flexibility and speed compared to other international
institutions” is its decentralized structure. 250 While decision
making and direction planning of the OECD are left to the
OECD Council, comprised of one representative of each mem-
ber country and the EU,251 the productive work is handled by
specialized directorates.252 These directorates are governed by
committees that have representatives of each member country
who are members of the relevant government agency to the
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 256.
249. Id. at 257.
250. Id. at 257–58.
251. Who Does What, supra note 241; James Salzman, Labor Rights, Glob-
alization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 769, 782 (2000).
252. For example, the Trade Directorate “analyzes trade policies, explores
the basis for common positions, and fleshes out disagreements in advance of
future negotiations under the WTO.” Id. at 782.
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committee’s specific policy,253 and work together to “advance
ideas and review progress in specific policy areas.”254 These
committees are broken down even further into different groups
to perform specific tasks.255 In sum, there are about 250 com-
mittees and different groups.256 The OECD’s “range of inter-
governmental committees serve as useful talking shops for
countries to share experiences, learning from one another’s
successes and challenges.”257
While the decentralized groups are significant to accruing
and disseminating information to shape policies, the OECD
Council’s role is highly influential in the realm of international
lawmaking.258 The OECD Convention grants the OECD Coun-
cil with the authority to take three types of legal action:259 (1)
issue recommendations;260 (2) adopt decisions;261 and (3) enter
into agreements with both member countries and nonmember
countries, as well as international organizations.262
Recommendations are the least forceful, acting as “nonbind-
ing agreements that generally represent policy advice with a
strong base of support.”263 Additionally, recommendations often
act as framework to influence member countries’ own policy
development or serve as a precursor to issuing a decision.264
Generally, decisions are binding on all member countries and
taken by their mutual agreement.265 Although, they do not im-
253. For example, “[t]he Environment Directorate’s committee is drawn
from officials of environment ministries and agencies.” Salzman, supra note
251 at 782.
254. These specific policy areas include “economics, trade, science, employ-
ment, education or financial markets.” Who Does What, supra note 241.
255. Id.; Salzman, supra note 251, at 782.
256. Who Does What, supra note 241.
257. Salzman, supra note 251, at 782.
258. Id. at 257–58.
259. OECD Convention, supra note 233, art. 7 (“A Council composed of all
Members shall be the body from which all acts of the Organisation derive.”);
Salzman, supra note 236, at 782 (“Decisions and recommendations are voted
on by the OECD Council at the ambassadorial level . . . .”).
260. OECD Convention, supra note 233, art. 5(b).
261. Id. art. 5(a).
262. Id. art. 5(c).
263. See Salzman, supra note 270, at 779.
264. Id.
265. This is not a universally applied rule because Article 5(a) states that
decisions shall be binding on all member countries, “except as otherwise pro-
vided.” OECD Convention, supra note 233, art. 5(a). Article 6(1) states that in
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pose the same legal obligations as international treaties, mem-
bers are required to take the necessary measures to implement
them, once adopted.266
Although the OECD’s authority to enter into international
agreements has been used less frequently than its authority to
issue recommendations and decisions, “the OECD’s drafting of
international agreements has played a significant role in craft-
ing the emerging architecture of global governance.”267 Addi-
tionally, although a limited number of agreements have been
created by the OECD itself, the influence of OECD recommen-
dations and decisions helps shape international policy by lead-
ing actors to use these instruments as starting points to build
policy from.268
2. The OECD Guidelines
Based on a recommendation issued in 1980, the OECD
Guidelines were created.269 Similar to the EU Directive, the
OECD Guidelines sought to balance the need for protection of
privacy with the free flow of information.270 To achieve this, the
OECD Guidelines provide key definitions for implementation,
instructions for protecting the flow of data, and set out a scope
of restrictions on data transfers.271
The OECD Guidelines became highly influential and paved
the way for laws in a variety of countries.272 The drafters of the
special cases, decisions will be taken unanimously. Id. art. 6(1). An example
of a decision taken by the OECD is that which confirmed the importance of
the Polluter-Pays Principle, which is “a fundamental principle for allocating
costs of pollution prevention and control measures introduced by the public
authorities in Member countries.” The decision states, where a polluter pol-
lutes, the expenses related to the pollution’s impact should be allocated to the
polluter. Salzman, supra note 235, at 258 (internal quotations omitted).
266. OECD Legal Instruments, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/whodoeswhat/ (last visited Mar. 8 2016).
267. An example of a legal instrument the OECD created is the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention. Id. at 259.
268. See generally id. at 255.
269. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Guidelines Governing Pro-
tection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc.
C(80)58/FINAL (Sept. 23, 1980),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandt
ransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
270. Alo, supra note 102, at 1176.
271. Id.
272. Tene, supra note 40, at 1221.
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OECD Guidelines recognized the growing privacy concerns that
accompanied advances in technology. 273 They also acknowl-
edged the increasing complexities arising out of disparities be-
tween the data-privacy laws of different countries.274 The draft-
ers also went on to note that although there are large dispari-
ties in the different laws, there seems to be general principles
that are widely accepted throughout the international commu-
nity.275 These principles were the first iteration of what has
come to be referred to as the Fair Information Practice Princi-
ples (“FIPPS”). 276 These principles were later adopted by a
273. ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 40
(2013) [hereinafter OECD EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM],
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf (“Public inter-
est has tended to focus on the risks and implications associated with the
computerized processing of personal data and some countries have chosen to
enact statutes that deal exclusively with computers and computer-supported
activities.”).
274. Id. at 39 (“These laws have tended to assume different forms in differ-
ent countries, and in many countries are still in the process of being devel-
oped. The disparities in legislation may create obstacles to the free flow of
information between countries.”).
275. These principles include:
setting limits to the collection of personal data in accordance with
the objective of the data collector and similar criteria; restricting the
usage of data to conform with openly specified purposes; creating fa-
cilities for individuals to learn of the existence and contents of data
and have data corrected; and the identification of parties who are re-
sponsible for compliance with the relevant privacy protection rules
and decisions.
Id. at 41.
276. Tene, supra note 40, at 1221–22. The first principle of FIPPS is the
“Collection Limitation Principle,” which holds that there should be re-
strictions on collecting personal data, limiting collection to lawful and fair
means. OECD Guidelines, supra note 269, pt. 2, § 7. The principle also rec-
ommends that consent, or at least knowledge by the data subject, should be
given “where appropriate.” Id. The second principle is the “Data Quality
Principle,” which recommends that when personal data is being used it
should be relevant to the purpose of the use, and the data should be kept up-
to-date and accurate. Id pt. 2, § 8. The third principle is the “Purpose Specifi-
cation Principle,” which states that when data is being collected, the purpose
of such a collection should be stated. Id. pt. 2, § 9. The fourth principle is the
“Use Limitation Principle,” which contends that data should not be used or
disclosed for purposes other than that which was stated. Id. pt. 2, § 10. The
two exceptions to this are when there is the data subject’s consent or when
the data is being acquired by a law authority. Id. The fifth principle is the
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number of different countries in national legislation and are
still utilized today.277
One of the strongest aspects of the OECD Guidelines is its
use of simple and versatile definitions of key data-privacy
terms.278 Its definition of “personal data”279 has been commend-
ed as “quite resistant to change” as its technological-neutrality
has allowed it to remain adaptable to current innovations.280
The EU Directive’s definition of “personal data” is notably simi-
lar, showing the heavy influence the OECD Guidelines still
have today.281
The OECD Guidelines were created to encourage countries to
establish their own data-privacy legislation, utilizing the guide-
lines as a minimum standard.282 However, they are not binding
and, unlike the EU Directive, countries are not mandated to
pass legislation based on these recommendations.283 These min-
imum standards have no effect if they are not enacted. Another
problem with the OECD Guidelines is that they lay the
“Security Safeguards Principle,” which provides that there should be reason-
able security protecting personal data from risks such as unauthorized ac-
cess, use, destruction or some type of loss. Id. pt. 2, § 11. The sixth principle
is the “Openness Principle,” which holds that the general use, policies, devel-
opments, and practices in relation to personal data should be made public. Id.
pt. 2, § 12. It specifies that the data controllers’ location should be apparent.
Id. The seventh principle is the “Individual Participation Principle,” which
provides that individuals should have some control over the use of their data.
Id. pt. 2, § 13. They should be able to obtain their data and challenge the use
of their data, and if their challenges are successful, they should be able to
have their data removed from wherever it resides. Id. The final principle is
the “Accountability Principle,” which states that “[a] data controller should be
accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles
stated above.” Id. pt. 2, § 14.
277. Tene, supra note 40, at 1221–26. FIPPS were adopted by the United
States in the Privacy Act of 1974, by Canada in the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (Can.)), and by the
EU in the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, C.E.T.S. 108, as well as in
the EU Directive, where it adopted the definition of “personal information.”
Tene, supra note 40, at 1221–26.
278. Tene, supra note 40, at 1221–22.
279. The Act defines it as any information which relates to “an identified or
identifiable individual.” OECD Guidelines, supra note 269, pt. 1, § 2.
280. See Tene, supra note 40, at 1221–22.
281. Id.
282. OECD Guidelines, supra note 269, pt. 1, § 6.
283. Tene, supra note 40, at 1222.
762 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2
groundwork for standards that countries should aim to achieve
without providing any enforcement mechanisms for achieving
such standards.284 Nonetheless, there has been a significant
increase in member countries’ national privacy legislation, as
well as the number of authorities that have enforcement re-
sponsibilities related to data privacy since the adoption of the
OECD Guidelines.285
In July 2013, the OCED Guidelines were updated to account
for the new ways in which data is being used and the new ac-
companying risks.286 The two themes purported to run through
the updated guidelines are risk management and improved in-
teroperability.287 Despite these changes, these guidelines are
still not in any way binding.288 As a result, disparities in data-
privacy protection continue to exist. Nonetheless, the existence
of these guidelines provides the international community with
a platform to start building upon in order to create a binding
legal instrument.
D. GPEN
In 2007, the OECD adopted a recommendation developed by the
OECD Committee for Information, Computer and Communica-
tions Policy (“ICC”), which called for more cooperation amongst
international authorities in order to better protect personal-data
privacy.289 This recommendation was adopted after the OECD
recognized that there was a growing rate of cross-border data flow
and increased risks to data privacy as a result.290 As has been the
284. Id.
285. Whereas, at the time of the OECD Guidelines’ adoption, only around
one-third of its OECD members had some type of privacy legislation, now
nearly all member-countries have legislation that provides for privacy protec-
tion, as well as established authorities with enforcement powers. Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in
the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy 4 (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/38770483.pdf [hereinafter OECD Rec-
ommendation].
286. See generally OECD EXPLANATORYMEMORANDUM, supra note 273.
287. The new guidelines provide national privacy strategies, privacy man-
agement programs, and data security breach notification standards. Tene,
supra note 40, at 1231.
288. See generally OECD EXPLANATORYMEMORANDUM, supra note 273.
289. OECD Recommendation, supra note 285.
290. The OECD and other international organizations, including the Inter-
national Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, the EU
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case in a number of other areas of law, the OECD recommended
that its member countries establish “an informal network of Pri-
vacy Enforcement Authorities . . . to discuss the practical aspects
of privacy law enforcement co-operation, share best practices in
addressing cross-border challenges, work to develop shared en-
forcement priorities, and support joint enforcement initiatives and
awareness raising campaigns.”291
Based on this recommendation, GPEN was established in
2010.292 GPEN is meant to exist as an informal network of da-
ta-protection authorities and regulators who can work together
in the enforcement of the wide range of data-privacy laws that
currently exist. 293 GPEN is specifically meant to target en-
forcement in the private sector.294 The network is also meant to
serve as a mechanism for countries to discuss different issues
of data-privacy law and share new information and experiences
with one another.295
At its inception, it was not fully understood how GPEN would
function.296 In June 2012,297 an action plan was adopted, outlin-
ing GPEN’s goals and how it intends to achieve them.298 As
time goes on, the number of members continues to rise. GPEN
proponents have maintained hope that as members communi-
cate about their different enforcement practices, they will de-
velop similar priorities, ultimately leading to more of a cohe-
Article 29 Working Party, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, have
begun to draw attention to the need for cooperation in data privacy in recent
years. Id at 4.
291. OECD Recommendation, supra note 285.
292. GLOB. PRIVACY ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.privacyenforcement.net
(last visited Oct. 21 2015).
293. Action Plan for the Global Privacy Enforcement Network, GPEN (Jan.
22, 2013) [hereinafter GPEN Action Plan],
https://www.privacyenforcement.net/public/activities.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Amy R. Worley, On the Heels of FTC, FCC Joins Global Privacy En-
forcement Network (GPEN) to Better Watch Data, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 30, 2014)
[hereinafter On the Heels of the FTC],
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/heels-ftc-fcc-joins-global-privacy-
enforcement-network-gpen-to-better-watch-data-abr.
297. This action plan was amended on January 22, 2013. GPEN Action
Plan, supra note 293.
298. See generally id.
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sive set of data-privacy laws throughout the world.299 However,
this action plan is not legally binding.300 Thus, in practice, it is
likely that there will still be varying levels of protections and
large inconsistencies between the laws of different nations.
The formation of GPEN and the widening inclusion of different
countries into the network shows the global recognition of the
need for cooperation in the area of data-privacy law. Members of
GPEN have already begun to create certain mechanisms that will
facilitate the cooperation amongst participating governments.301
One of these mechanisms is the GPEN Alert.302 GPEN members
299. On October 28, 2014, the FCC joined GPEN, adding another U.S.
agency to its members alongside the FTC, which was already a member. On
the Heels of FTC, supra note 296. The European Data Protection Supervisor
currently represents the EU. For a comprehensive list of all of the member
authorities, see GLOB. PRIVACY ENF’T NETWORK,
https://www.privacyenforcement.net (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
300. The domestic laws will remain the preeminent authority over GPEN:
Cooperation pursuant to this Action Plan remains subject to the do-
mestic laws and international obligations applicable to Participants.
Nothing in this Action Plan obliges Participants to provide confiden-
tial or sensitive information or cooperate in particular cases. This
Action Plan does not create a legally binding mechanism for Partici-
pants to exchange information about specific investigations and cas-
es. Such cooperation remains subject to the applicable laws in the ju-
risdictions involved.
GPEN Action Plan, supra note 293.
301. Another recent action taken by GPEN incudes the Privacy Sweep (the
“Sweep”). Results of the 2015 Global Privacy Enforcement Network Sweep,
OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN. (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2015/bg_150902_e.asp. The Sweep consist-
ed of participants visiting “1,494 websites and mobile applications (apps) that
were either targeted at or popular among children.” Id. The purpose of the
Sweep was “to determine whether apps and websites are collecting personal
information from children, what personal information is being collected,
whether protective controls exist to effectively limit the collection and wheth-
er the information could be easily deleted.” Id.
302. At its outset, GPEN Alert will be used
to notify other member authorities of their privacy investigations
and enforcement actions, particularly those that have cross-border
aspects, for purposes of potential coordination and cooperation. In
the future, GPEN Alert functions may be expanded to allow the
sharing of additional confidential, non-public enforcement infor-
mation relating to specific investigations and enforcement matters,
and/or to allow the sharing of consumer complaints relating to priva-
cy.
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who utilize GPEN Alert will be able to use the mechanism for two
purposes: (1) to notify other GPEN members about investigations
and law enforcement matters; and (2) to determine whether other
GPEN members have previously begun any investigations or law
enforcement matters against the same individuals, companies, or
practices.303 So far, the FTC, along with agencies from seven other
countries, have signed the Memorandum of Understanding,
which is required in order to participate in GPEN Alert.304 Be-
cause GPEN Alert was recently created, it is not yet known how
effective this mechanism will be in practice.305 It is important to
note, however, that GPEN members will not automatically be-
come participants in GPEN Alert. Each member authority that
wants to participate must voluntarily submit to a variety of steps
in order to gain access to this tool, and even then each member
will be able to decide what information they want to input into
the system.306 Due to its voluntary nature, this tool will only be as
useful as participating members allow it to be.307 Nonetheless,
GPEN, A Secure Information-Sharing System for the Global Privacy En-
forcement Network, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151026g
pen-alert-mou.pdf (last visited Feb 16, 2016).
303. Id. at 2. Today, GPEN Alert uses the same technology used in the
FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, which consists of a database that stores
consumer complaints submitted to the FTC and provides access to participat-
ing U.S. law enforcement agencies. Hunton & Williams, GPEN Launches
New Global Consumer Privacy Protection Initiative, PRIVACY & INFO.
SECURITY L. BLOG (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/10/30/gpen-launches-new-global-
consumer-privacy-protection-initiative/.
304. The other agencies that signed on are from Australia, Canada, Ireland,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Id.
305. The FTC issued a press release regarding GPEN Alert on October 26,
2015. Id.
306. In order to gain access to GPEN Alert, members have to sign the Mem-
orandum of Understanding, as well as execute both a Data Security and Min-
imum Safeguard Certification of Access to GPEN Alert Information. FTC and
Seven International Partners Launch New Initiative to Boost Cooperation in
Protecting Consumer Privacy, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/10/ftc-seven-
international-partners-launch-new-initiative-boost.
307. Despite the FTC’s promotion of GPEN Alert, there has been less en-
thusiasm demonstrated by its other participants. Only one of the seven other
participants even published a press release regarding their participation.
Keiren McCarthy, Feds in America Very Excited About New Global Privacy
766 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2
this step illustrates the desire amongst participating countries to
work together within the realm of data privacy. It also provides
the international community with an organization that can be put
to good use in the development of a convention on data privacy.
The efforts of the EU and U.S. governments to create a
mechanism that allows for the continued transfer of personal
data between the regions demonstrates the importance of the
free flow of data around the world. The failure of the Safe Har-
bor, however, demonstrates the issues that continue to hinder
governments’ ability to protect the personal data of their citi-
zens. By reviewing the contributions of the OECD, it becomes
apparent that although there are diverging data-privacy laws,
there is a lot of common ground to work with and a shared de-
sire for harmonization of data-privacy policies on a global level.
Additionally, the creation of GPEN further demonstrates the
desire for different nations to work together in this area of law,
further signifying the need for a convention on data privacy.
III. THE CISG AS AMODEL FOR A CONVENTION ONDATA
PRIVACY
In 1980, the Vienna Sales Convention was held and the
CISG draft text was adopted with very little amendment.308
The CISG is a treaty consisting of a set of laws that govern the
international sales contracts between private businesses of
participating nations.309 Today, it is recognized as one of the
most successful examples of a multijurisdictional private
law.310 Looking back at its development can provide insight in-
to how comprehensive international private law is developed.
Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the CISG can facili-
tate the structuring of a convention on data privacy.
The CISG serves as an excellent example of the diplomatic
drafting of a new convention. Using the CISG as a model, a con-
vention on data privacy should be drafted under the auspices of
the OECD. The key elements of the CISG that should be imple-
mented for this new convention include the process by which it
Alert System, REGISTER (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/26/ftc_excited_about_gpis/.
308. Sono, supra note 28, at 6.
309. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG), UNCITRAL (last visited Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html.
310. Andersen, supra note 25, at 14–15.
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was developed, its capitalization on key timing, its automatic ap-
plication to private parties who live in signatory states, its use of
simple, clear, and practical language, and its creation of a gap-
filling mechanism to deal with issues not explicitly covered by the
convention that should nonetheless be governed by it. Additional-
ly, to improve upon the CISG’s model and tailor it to the needs of
data-privacy, the new convention should provide for supervisory
authorities in each signatory state to ensure the convention is be-
ing interpreted and applied in a uniform manner.
A. Development
The CISG’s success came after decades of efforts directed to-
ward the establishment of a unified body of law that addressed
the sale of goods internationally. The road to the CISG started in
1926, when the International Institute for the Unification of Pri-
vate Law (“UNIDROIT”)311 decided to pursue a uniform body of
law for the international sale of goods based on “the principle that
a uniform law of international sales should be based on the basic
principles of private law which could be arrived at through the
comparison of national laws rather [than] commercial practice.”
312 After a number of drafts were presented and reworked,
UNIDROIT ultimately produced two separate conventions at the
Hague Conference of 1964: the Convention for the Uniform Law
of International Sales and the Convention for the Uniform Law on
the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(together, “the Hague Conventions”).313 Despite these efforts, only
nine nations ratified the Hague Conventions, prompting the
United Nations to embark on a process to gain wider adoption of
an international sales law.314
311. Sieg Eiselen, Adoption of the Vienna Convention for the International
Sale of Goods (the CISG) in South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 323, 333 (1999).
UNIDROIT now operates as “an independent intergovernmental Organisa-
tion . . . to study needs and methods for modernizing, harmonizing and co-
ordinating private and in particular commercial law as between States and
groups of States and to formulate uniform law instruments, principles and
rules to achieve those objectives.” History and Overview, UNIDROIT,
http://www.unidroit.org/about-unidroit/overview (last updated Jan. 13, 2016).
312. Sono, supra note 28, at 1.
313. Eiselen, supra note 311, at 333.
314. Id. at 334.
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In 1966, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”)315 was created by the U.N. General
Assembly to facilitate the unification of international trade
law.316 At that time, it became apparent that an international
trade law was needed in order to “provide a uniform law to ap-
ply to private transactions of companies with businesses in dif-
ferent nations.”317 As businesses from different countries began
to conduct cross-border transactions on an increasingly com-
mon basis, problems began to arise with conflicting contract
interpretation by different nations’ legal systems.318 This creat-
ed both uncertainty and difficulty for parties from different
countries in entering sales contracts.319
In order to better understand how to promote wider adoption
of a convention amongst different nations, UNCITRAL con-
ducted analyses of the Hague Conventions.320Through its re-
search, UNCITRAL discovered that the most prominent areas
of concern with these conventions were their overall complexity
and the lack of global representation during their creation.321
As a result, UNCITRAL created a working group to determine
ways to revise the Hague Conventions to more appropriately fit
both the needs and desires of more countries.322At each stage of
the drafting process, the text was sent to governments and oth-
er interested international organizations for their feedback,
which was subsequently used to help improve the text.323
Just like UNCITRAL, GPEN was created to research an area
of law that, due to its lack of uniformity, causes a great deal of
confusion and difficulty for parties of different nations to do
business with one another. UNCITRAL can be compared to
GPEN in a variety of ways. Both organizations were created to
315. UNCITRAL is “[t]he core legal body of the United Nations system in
the field of international trade law.” About UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
316. Sono, supra note 28, at 1.
317. Maureen T. Murphy, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Creating Uniformity in International Sales Law,
12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 727, 728 (1988).
318. See Eiselen, supra note 311, at 324–27.
319. Id.
320. Sono, supra note 28, at 1–2.
321. Id. at 2–5.
322. This group is titled the “Working Group on the International Sale of
Goods.” Id. at 3.
323. Id. at 3–5.
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assist in alleviating problems arising out of the lack of uniform
law in their respective industries.324 Additionally, both were
created in order to research and analyze the current state of
law and determine how to improve it. Finally, the ultimate goal
in creating both UNCITRAL and GPEN was to foster the dis-
covery of the best framework for governing their respective in-
dustries in order to help unify the law of different nations gov-
erning said industries.325
In order for a convention on data privacy to be successful,
there should be a similar drafting process to the CISG, utilizing
GPEN to facilitate the process. Just as UNCITRAL researched
the problems impeding the development of a unified law in in-
ternational sales, GPEN is planning to research the current
issues hindering the enforcement of different national laws re-
garding personal data protection, and preventing cross-border
cooperation in order to strengthen personal privacy protection
on a global level.326 GPEN should take this research a step fur-
ther and look into what is needed to adopt a unified law on da-
ta privacy. Just as UNCITRAL reviewed and analyzed failed
attempts at harmonizing sales law, GPEN should examine the
failed attempts to harmonize data-privacy law amongst differ-
ent nations, including the Safe Harbor and the EU Directive.
GPEN’s current goals are focused on cooperation and educa-
tion.327 However, this is the perfect platform to begin drafting
legislation. There are already forty-four different jurisdictions
represented within GPEN.328 Following in UNCITRAL’s foot-
steps, after sufficient research has been conducted, GPEN
should create a working group to start drafting laws. Just as
the drafts leading to the CISG were passed to different coun-
324. Id. at 1–5; GPEN Action Plan, supra note 293.
325. Sono, supra note 28, at 1–5; GPEN Action Plan, supra note 293.
326. GPEN Action Plan, supra note 293.
327. Id.
328. Currently, this includes Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, the EU, Estonia, France,
Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hungary, Ireland, Isle of
Man, Israel, Italy, Korea, Kosovo, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mal-
ta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Manoco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. About the Network, GLOB. PRIVACY
ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.privacyenforcement.net/about_the_network
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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tries for revision and recommendations,329 the drafts created by
this working group should be passed around to the members of
GPEN. Through this process, countries can decide on transpar-
ent and clearly-defined procedures for turning personal infor-
mation over to domestic governments, thereby eliminating
fears of secret government surveillance. This process will allow
countries to ensure their desires are reflected and will ulti-
mately help gain wider adoption.
One major difference between the development of a conven-
tion on data privacy and the development of the CISG is that
this convention should be enacted under the auspices of the
OECD instead of the U.N. With the statistics of data transfers
continuing to rise at a rapid pace, a convention on data privacy
is needed as quickly as possible. Unlike the U.N., which has a
much broader global representation, the OECD has a more re-
strictive membership, inclusive of countries with similar eco-
nomic interests and levels of development, and therefore offers
more opportunity for similar policy approaches to creating a
data-privacy law. Furthermore, the privacy offered by the
closed-door meetings of the OECD provides an opportunity for
participating governments to talk about the sensitive problems
associated with national security openly, without fearing that
information will be released to unwanted parties, which will
help facilitate a solution between the involved nations.
B. Timing
In addition to the efforts put into drafting the CISG, timing
was a key factor that led to its success. Whereas prior attempts
at drafting an international sales law had failed due to ill-
timing,330 the CISG was formulated when international trade
was becoming so pervasive that countries were receptive to a
law that would protect those engaging in international sales,
while still promoting the growth of the international market.331
Similarly today, the global community is reaching the point
329. Sono, supra note 28, at 3–5.
330. Id. at 5. (“Although the legislative process was open to all States, the
newly emerging developing countries were not yet necessarily at the forefront
of the international scene. Socialist countries were almost about to join or
even to initiate the global unification effort of the law of trade, perhaps partly
based on the then new trend for the strengthening of the East-West economic
relations, but the timing was still a few years short.”)
331. See id.
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that it needs an international law on data privacy that will pro-
tect those whose data is being used, while promoting the free
flow of data of the world.
Significantly, it has been noted that during the Hague Con-
ference of 1964332 the fact that the United States “was not well-
prepared” to participate in the unification process was a con-
tributing factor to this attempt’s lack of success.333 When the
CISG was finally adopted, the United States had finally devel-
oped to a point that it could participate.334 Similarly, today the
global community is reaching the point that it needs an inter-
national law on data privacy that will protect those whose data
is being used, while promoting the free flow of that data.335 As
seen with the failure of the Safe Harbor, until nations sign onto
a piece of binding legislation, domestic law will remain the pre-
vailing force governing personal data and inconsistent levels of
protection will continue to exist.
As was the case with the CISG, the United States’ current
position on data privacy is finally maturing to a point that
would allow for participation in an international convention.
The United States’ policy on regulating personal data has made
a noticeable migration towards providing stricter protections,
and thus offers a ripening opportunity for a convention on data
privacy to be proposed at this time when the country is recep-
tive to such legislation. The FTC, whose approach to data pri-
vacy had in the past reflected the general U.S. policy in favor of
self-regulation, is now at the forefront of pushing for broad leg-
islation and heightened data protection.336 Thus, indicating a
dramatic shift from prior U.S. policy regarding data-privacy
legislation. Additionally, the push toward international cooper-
ation by the Obama administration demonstrates an openness
to participating in a data-privacy convention.337 Furthermore,
U.S. companies that engage in international data transfers
332. Id.
333. Id. (“The United States decided to join in the unification movement in
1964 for the first time, but was not well-prepared for the Hague Conference
although it participated.”)
334. See id.
335. This goal is represented in the EU Directive. Council Directive 95/46,
supra note 38, pmbl. This goal is also represented in the OECD’s privacy
framework. OECD EXPLANATORYMEMORANDUM, supra note 273, at 3.
336. See generally 2012 REPORT, supra note 136.
337. Tene, supra note 40, at 1235.
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have recently exhibited a willingness to abide by stricter
standards, which demonstrates that parties who would be gov-
erned by this convention are on board for its adoption. Fur-
thermore, the United States’ willingness to agree to stricter re-
strictions on governmental access to personal data covered by
the Privacy Shield demonstrates the ability for nations to coop-
erate and modify their domestic policies to allow for the free
flow of data. Finally, the United States is currently represented
by both the FTC and FCC in GPEN,338 demonstrating both the
willingness and an ability to participate in unification efforts.
C. Automatic Application with an Opt-Out Option
The CISG is automatically applied to agreements between
parties who reside, or have their place of business, in countries
that are members of the CISG.339 If these parties do not want
the CISG to apply to their transactions, they can utilize the
opt-out mechanism the CISG provides.340 With this option, the
CISG operates as a default rule.341 If the participating parties
want to avoid the application of the CISG, there are certain re-
quirements that must be fulfilled.342 These requirements en-
sure that the parties are fully aware of the rights provided by
the CISG before consenting to its exclusion, which protects
each party from being taken advantage of.343
The convention on data privacy should have a similar opt-out
option. The freedom to contract out of the convention will allow
for a level of flexibility that will entice more countries to join.
However, because these agreements will often be between large
companies and individuals using their services, it is important to
have stringent requirements for opting out. By providing an opt-
out option, companies can avoid the requirements of this conven-
tion when doing business with other sophisticated parties. How-
338. On the Heels of the FTC, supra note 296.
339. Morten M. Fogt, Private International Sales Law Issues in Opt-Out
and Opt-In Instruments of Harmonization: The CISG and the Proposal For a
Common European Sales Law, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 89–90 (2013).
340. CISG, supra note 26, art. 6.
341. Fogt, supra note 339, at 89–90.
342. The parties must be aware of the CISG and their automatic applica-
tion. The parties must wish to opt-out of the CISG, and this decision has to be
reached by both parties. The decision to avoid the CISG cannot be unilateral
Id. at 90–91.
343. See generally id.
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ever, it will still ensure that individuals’ privacy rights are pro-
tected and will make sure they are completely aware of how their
personal information is being used by these companies. These re-
quirements should reflect those of the CISG: both parties should
understand the convention exists and is automatically applied;
after having full knowledge of the convention they must actively
opt-out of its use; and there must be consent on both sides of the
agreement before the opt-out is valid.344 By having such a re-
quirement, companies will be unable to hide their data-collection
practices in a remotely-placed website privacy policy that as-
sumes user’s consent solely by using the website. Instead, compa-
nies will be required to explicitly tell users what information they
plan to collect from them, how they plan to collect it, and who
they plan to share it with, and will be required to ensure that us-
ers fully understand these rights before they can consent to the
collection and processing of their personal information. Further-
more, this opt-out provision could be accompanied by a similar
requirement to that of the EU Directive that limits the circum-
stances by which personal data can be processed to those that fur-
ther a legitimate purpose, thereby further safeguarding individu-
als’ privacy.
D. Simple, Clear, and Practical
One of the largest obstacles in regulating data privacy is drafting
a law that can apply to future unforeseen innovations in technolo-
gy. Three characteristics of the CISG that have been fundamental
to its success are its “simplicity, practicality, and clarity.”345
During the drafting process, drafters of the CISG recognized
that the use of short-hand expressions in the text could result
in varying interpretations.346 As a result, the drafters avoided
the use of short-hand expressions as much as possible.347 When
the use of such expressions was unavoidable, drafters made
sure to provide a clear definition of what they were referring
to.348
344. Fogt, supra note 339, at 90–91.
345. Sono, supra note 28, at 6.
346. Id. at 6–7.
347. Id.
348. For example, the word “delivery” was unavoidable, but drafters made
sure to provide a clear definition that could not be misconstrued by interpret-
ers. Id.
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Similar to the way CISG drafters avoided short-hand expres-
sions, drafters of this convention should avoid using language
that is too specific to current technologies. It would be useful
for drafters to look to the technology-neutral language found
within the OECD Guidelines, which has remained relevant
with the passage of time.349 For example, the definition of “per-
sonal data” established in the OECD Guidelines is any infor-
mation, which relates to “an identified or identifiable individu-
al.”350 This definition avoids referencing anything other than
how the data relates to an individual. Its simplicity allows it to
apply to different forms of data, whether it be data stored in
“the Cloud”351 or data stored on a hard-drive.352 Simple, clear,
and practical language will allow the convention to remain
practical, while technology continues to develop.
E. Gap-Filling Mechanism
Another way to address the rapid growth of technology is by
creating a gap-filling mechanism to cover issues that are not orig-
inally written into the convention, but nonetheless should be gov-
erned by it. The CISG has its own gap-filling mechanism, which is
meant to assist courts and tribunals with filling in areas left out
of the CISG in a way that continues to promote uniformity.353
This mechanism is to be used when a matter arises that is “gov-
erned by” the CISG, but has not been expressly dealt with by any
of its provisions.354 When confronted with a matter of this nature,
the CISG requires that the matter be “settled in conformity with
the general principles on which it is based.”355 If no general prin-
349. See Tene, supra note 40, at 1221–22.
350. OECD Guidelines, supra note 269, pt.1 § 1(b).
351. “The Cloud” is a “collection of computing resources such as applica-
tions, storage space and processing power to be delivered via the Internet.”
Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Gov-
ernment Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
359, 363–64. (2010).
352. A hard drive stores data within a computer on a disk. Tim Fisher,
What is a Hard Disk Drive?, ABOUT TECH,
http://pcsupport.about.com/od/componentprofiles/p/p_hdd.htm (last visited
Feb. 16, 2016).
353. CISG, supra note 26, art. 7(2).
354. Id.
355. Id.
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cipals can be applied to govern the matter then as a last resort,
the appropriate domestic sales law will be applied.356
The issue with the use of general principles to fill gaps within
the CISG is that the text of the CISG never actually defines
any general principles.357 Without a clear set of principles to
turn to, courts and tribunals often skip over the step of trying
to fill in a gap with the general principles and instead refer to
domestic law.358 This problem eliminates the predictability and
reliability that the CISG is meant to provide to foreign mer-
chants.359 Furthermore, avoiding use of the general principles
is unfair to foreign parties who are unfamiliar with domestic
laws and should not be subject to them under circumstances
where the CISG applies.360
Conveniently, a lack of clear, defined principles will not be an
issue in the realm of data privacy. Since their first iteration in
the OECD Guidelines, FIPPS have been internationally recog-
nized as the general principles of data privacy.361 These princi-
ples are already reflected in different pieces of national data-
privacy legislation throughout the world and continue to be
promoted by proposals for new legislation.362 These principles
356. Andersen, supra note 25, at 15.
357. Id. Because no list could be exhaustive of all of the potential principles,
the drafters feared that if any were codified, the remaining principles would
never be utilized. Id. at 25. Refraining from listing the principles also served
to provide courts with a level of flexibility to adequately address concepts
such as fair practice, public policy, and fundamental justice. Id at 26. As a
result, “the ‘general principles’ alluded to are not tangible, but can best be
described as non-codified expressions of the underlying ideas which permeate
the CISG.” Id. at 24. Often they are described as embodying the “spirit of the
convention.” Id. at 25.
358. Philip Hackney, Is the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods Achieving Uniformity?, 61 LA. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (2001).
359. Franco Ferrari, Homeward Trend and Lex Forism Despite Uniform
Sales Law, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 15, 20 (2009),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ferrari17.html.
360. Mauricio Gomm Santos & Quinn Smith, Reviewing the History and
Application of Article 7, CISG BRASIL (2011), http://www.cisg-
bra-
sil.net/doc/Reviewing_the_History_and_Application_of_Article_7_%28Final%
29.pdf.
361. Tene, supra note 40, at 1221.
362. See, e.g., WHITEHOUSE REPORT, supra note 156. Additionally, the FTC
noted in its 2012 Report, “[n]umerous comments, including those from large
industry stakeholders, consumer and privacy advocates, and individual con-
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should be provided within the convention and utilized to govern
matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the convention, but
are not expressly settled within it. By utilizing the same mech-
anism that the CISG provides, along with an accompanying set
of explicit, widely accepted principles, this convention will be
able to circumvent the issues that have been associated with
the interpretation of the CISG’s gap-filling provision.363
F. Supervisory Authority
Another way to improve upon the CISG’s model is by
providing for supervisory authorities that can assist in up-
holding the convention, and facilitate its application and in-
terpretation. Despite the large number of signatories to the
convention, “there is no court with general jurisdiction on
the CISG throughout the world, and the decisions and writ-
ings from one country are little more than persuasive au-
thority in another location.”364 The CISG encourages courts
and tribunals to look to one another for guidance, calling for
uniformity and regard to the CISG’s international character
when interpreting its provisions.365 Therefore, objectives of
the CISG should take precedence over the objectives of one’s
own domestic laws during interpretation.366 However, often
sumers supported some form of baseline privacy legislation that incorporates
the FIPPs.” 2012 REPORT, supra note 136, at 11.
363. An illustrative example of this problem is the Argentine case Alejandro
Mayer v. Onda Hofferle GmbH & Co., Apr. 24, 2000 (Cámara Nacional de
Apelaciones en lo Comercial), translated at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000424a1.html. The gap in this case was
“whether the quality of goods met the standards of the contract.” Id. Despite
the court’s finding that the CISG governed the case, when a gap was found
within one of the CISG’s provisions, instead of trying to fill it in with a gen-
eral principle, the court went straight to the Argentine Commercial Code. Id.
Commentators have criticized this decision, arguing that “[w]hile the CISG
does not contain the precise procedure for quality testing of goods, it certainly
addresses the issue of the quality of the goods and provides a framework for
dissolving the dispute.” Santos & Smith, supra note 360, at 11–12. In its as-
sessment, the court never performed the broader analysis under Article 7(2)
that is called for by the CISG. See id. Instead it went back and forth between
the CISG and the Argentine Commercial Code, picking and choosing when to
apply each law on its own accord. See id.
364. Id. at 9.
365. CISG, supra note 26, art. 7(1).
366. See Martin Gebauer, Uniform Law, General Principles and Autono-
mous Interpretation, UNI. L. REV. 683, 685–87 (2003).
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there is “the tendency by interpreters to turn to their famil-
iar and nonuniform, norms of domestic law in the interpreta-
tion of international standards.”367
To ensure this issue does not arise with the interpretation
and application of a convention on data privacy, the conven-
tion should delegate appropriate supervisory authorities.
One of the recognized strengths of the EU Directive was its
requirement that each Member State set up a regulatory au-
thority that is independent from any national influence for
individuals to bring claims.368 As discussed earlier, one of the
ECJ’s reasons for invalidating the Safe Harbor was the con-
cern that the United States does not currently provide indi-
viduals with a means for seeking judicial redress of data-
privacy issues.369 Although the Privacy Shield provides for
new avenues of redress, it still does not provide for an au-
thority that is solely dedicated to the protection and en-
forcement of data-security practices. Therefore it continues
to place agencies in a position where data-privacy concerns
are competing for their attention amongst a plethora of other
issues. By requiring signatories to set up independent data
protection authorities, this concern will be eliminated for
any country who becomes a member to the convention. Fur-
thermore, requiring these authorities to be independent from
national influence will ensure that data-privacy issues get
the full attention they require, thus avoiding the issues seen
with the FTC.370 Just as is provided for by the EU Directive,
claims may be appealed from these authorities up to the
courts of each country.371 GPEN should play a role in this
process as well, either operating as a commission itself or
creating one to act as a higher authority that can investigate
cases and watch over enforcement of the law, as well as pro-
vide advice to these authorities in a similar manner to the
way the Working Party has provided advice regarding the
EU Directive. This commission should punish violations of
367. Ferrari, supra note 359, at 24–25.
368. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, art. 28.
369. Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. 117/15.
370. Data-privacy issues must compete with other areas of the law that the
FTC enforces, which inevitably leads to a lack of necessary attention to the
data-privacy issues. See Tene, supra note 40, at 1225.
371. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, art. 28.
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the convention with sanctions, similar to what the Safe Har-
bor Program had called for.372
CONCLUSION
The current issues the international community faces due
to the varying data-privacy laws can only be alleviated by
creating a uniform binding instrument. Past efforts toward
creating recommendations and providing countries with the
flexibility to draft their own laws have continued to result in
inconsistencies and widely disproportionate laws that have
failed to facilitate cooperation. Just as the EU recognized the
need for a binding instrument within its own borders, the
members of the international community looking to partici-
pate in the free flow of data need to recognize that a conven-
tion on data privacy would substantially mitigate the prob-
lems associated with a lack of uniform law.
Drafters of a new data-privacy convention should utilize the
CISG to their advantage, as it provides practical benefits that
can be transferred over into the realm of data privacy. By mod-
eling a data-privacy convention on the CISG, drafters can uti-
lize a successful framework by adopting its strengths and
building upon its weaknesses, which have generated years’
worth of research and scholarship regarding how to improve
upon these areas. The convention on data privacy should utilize
the development process by which the CISG was created, using
GPEN as a similar devise as UNCITRAL, but utilizing the
OECD instead of the U.N. as a forum. The current state of data
privacy calls for a need for a uniform data-privacy law to facili-
tate companies’ ability to transfer data and therefore do busi-
ness in foreign nations, just as the CISG was needed in order to
facilitate companies to enter into contracts with foreign parties
and therefore do business in foreign nations. The element of
timing needs to be taken advantage of and the drafting process
must start immediately. Just like the CISG, this convention
must be automatic, thus allowing for consumer protection. The
terms should be simple, clear, and practical just like those of
the CISG in order to stay current with technology’s progres-
sion, and a gap-filling mechanism should be used to ensure the
372. The Safe Harbor called for sanctions to “be sufficiently rigorous to en-
sure compliance by the organization.” U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK,
supra note 186 at 6.
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currentness continues. Luckily, the presence of commonly ac-
cepted data-privacy principles will help this convention avoid
the weaknesses the CISG faces with its gap-filling mechanism.
Finally, supervisory authorities should be created just as they
were in the EU in order to uphold this convention and facilitate
its interpretation and application.
By creating this convention, the international community can
create a mechanism whereby the free flow of data around the
world can be facilitated. By doing so, technological innovation
will be promoted, the freedom of information can be preserved,
and transfers of data can be used to enhance the global econo-
my, yielding increased prosperity instead of increased tensions
amongst different nations around the world.
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